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INTRODUCTION 
This  volume of t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  c c n t a i n s  a  l i s t i n g  of t h e  s a f e t y  requ i re -  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  space  s h c t t l e  payloads genera ted  dur ing  t h e  s tudy.  
P a r t  I r e f e r s  t o  s o r t i e  modules; P a r t  11 t o  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s ;  and P a r t  111 
t o  the  space  s t a t i o n ,  S i m i l a r  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r  a r e  conta ined i n  Volume I V .  These volumes a r e  in tended f o r  use i n  per- 
formance s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i n  Phases C and D of t h e s e  programs. 
The requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  p resen ted  h e r e  a r e  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  haz- 
ards  and emergencies analyzed i n  t h e  s tudy t a s k s ,  and must n o t  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  
-
as a  complete list of  s a f e t y  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  va r ious  pro- 
grams. It is hoped, however, t h a t  t h e s e  volumes can b e  ampl i f i ed  as f u r t h e r  
s a f e t y  s t u d i e s  a r e  performed, s o  t h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  they w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  a  complete 
system s a f e t y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  cover ing  the  s a f e t y  a s p e c t s  of a l l  miss ion  phases 
of each veh ic le .  
The requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  two s e c t i o n s .  Sec t ion  3.0 
con ta ins  t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  which must be implemented on t h e  
s h u t t l e  payloads.  S e c t i o n  4.0 con ta ins  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  s a f e t y  requirements  and 
g u i d e l i n e s  wi th  t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ;  i .e . ,  t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  
which must b e  imposed on t h e  o r b i t e r  i n  o r d e r  t o  ensure  i ts  s a f e t y .  The s o r t i e  
i n c l u s i o n  of a  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  v e h i c l e ,  say  a s o r t i e  
module, must no t  be  taken a s  a  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  must 
b e  implemented by t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  program ( t h e  s o r t i e  module i n  t h i s  c a s e ) ,  o r  
charged t o  t h a t  program. It i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p rov i s ions  w i l l  p h y s i c a l l y  be  
implemented on t h a t  v e h i c l e .  
The source  of  t h e s e  requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  i s  Appendix D of Volume 
I1 of t h i s  r e p o r t ,  which con ta ins  t h e  hazardlemergency ana lyses  performed 
dur ing  t h e  s tudy.  The wording of  each requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  recommended 
i n  t h a t  volume is  used verbatim i n  t h i s  volume. A minor excep t ion  occurs  in 
a few cases  when two o r  t h r e e  p r a c t i c a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  s t a t ements  i n  t h e  hazard/  
emergency analyses  (e. g., one d e a l i n g  wi th  flammable, t o x i c  and c o r r o s i v e  
f l u i d s )  a r e  combined i n t o  one s t a t ement  (dea l ing  wi th  flammable, t o x i c  o r  cor- 
r o s i v e  f l u i d s )  , T r a c e a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  hazardlemergency a n a l y s i s  of Volume I1 is 
provided f o r  each re@cirement  and g u i d e l i n e  through two l e t t e r s  and a number 
o r  number l le . t te r  combmation (e .g. ,  RP-1.2.004 o r  GD-1.b) shown i n  parentheses  
a f t e r  each requirement and gu ide l ine .  This  numbering system, a s  w e l l  a s  the 
~ e f i n i t - f n n s  and format used, a r e  desc r ibed  i n  t h e  fo l lowing s e c t i o n s .  These 
a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  and methodology used in performing t h e  
hazardlemergency ana lyses .  
Sec t ions  5.0 d i scussed  t h e  r a t i o n a l  e f o r  t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  
i n  t h i s  volume. A second p a r e n t h e s i s  a f t e r  c e r t a i n  requirement8 and g u i d e l i n e s  
i n d i c a t e s  a c r o s s  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  i n  Sec t ion  5.0. 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
1.1 REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
The f i r s t  l e t t e r  i n  t h e  pa ren theses  a f t e r  each requirement and g u i d e l i n e  
i n d i c a t e s  whether i t  i s  a requirement (R) o r  a g u i d e l i n e  (G)  
The d i f f e r e n c e  between a requirement  and a g u i d e l i n e  is  as follows: 
o A requirement (R) is regarded a s  a "must implement" item from 
t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  o f  view, I t  e l i m i n a t e s  an a p p r e c i a b l e  element 
of r i s k  from t h e  t o t a l  spectrum of r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  hazard  o r  emergency. I f  recommended, a requirement 
is t h e r e f o r e  n o t  cons idered  as a n  i tem t o  b e  r e j e c t e d  f o r  c o s t ,  
weight o r  s i m i l a r  reasons ,  s i n c e  i t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  impacts s a f e t y .  
o A g u i d e l i n e  ( G )  is regarded as a "s t rong ly  recommended" i t e m  
from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. It does n o t  e l i m i n a t e  any appre- 
c i a b l e  element  of r i s k ,  a l though i t  may reduce t h e  occurrence 
o r  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t s  of t h e  hazard .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  s a f e t y  
from a g u i d e l i n e  i n  c e r t a i n  cixcums tances  may n o t  be commensur- 
a t e  wi th  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  of implementing i t ,  and t h e r e f o r d  i t  may 
be  t r aded  o f f  a g a i n s t  c o s t ,  weight ,  e t c .  There is, i n  a l l  cases, 
a s a f e t y  p e n a l t y  ( i n  t h e  Form of exposure t o  some a d d i t i o n a l  
r i s k )  whenever a g u i d e l i n e  is n o t  implemented, and t h i s  must b e  
recognized whenever such a d e c i s i o n  is taken.  
The requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  which were genera ted  were c a r e f u l l y  
worded s o  as t o  s a t i s f y  t h r e e  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  were considered  very impor tant .  
These cr i ter ia  a r e  t h a t  the  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  should: 
Be v e r i f i a b l e 0 4  .e., i t  shou ld  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  unambiguously 
v e r i f y  whether  each requirement  o r  g u i d e l i n e  has  been .met 
i n  the  des ign  o r  i n  t h e  planned opera t ions .  Ambiguous o r  
non-ver i f i ab le  words such as " t o  t h e  maximum e x t e n t  poss ib le"  
I I o r  adequate" have t h e r e f o r e  been avoided. 
Meet t h e  mathematician 's  "necessary b u t  s u f f i c i e n t "  c r i t e r i o n - -  
i.e., they should  s p e c i f y  every  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  must be met t o  
s a t i s f y  t h e  s a f e t y  o b j e c t i v e ,  b u t  they should  n o t  s p e c i f y  more 
than is r e q u i r e d  f o r  s a f e t y .  The latter p o i n t  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  
impor tant  s i n c e  the tendency is t o  s e l e c t  p a r t i c u l a r  des ign  o r  
o p e r a t i o n a l  so l .u t ions  which r e s t r i c t  t h e  des igner ' s  cho ice  
r a t h e r  than  s t a t i n g  only t h e  requirement i n  g e n e r a l  terns. 
B e  w r i t t e n  i n  p r e c i s e  and unambiguous language, s u i t a b l e  f o r  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  i n t o  pre l iminary  requirements  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
f o r  Phases B o r  C. 
1.2 REMEDIAL OR PREVENTIVE 
The second l e t t e r  in t h e  parentheses  a f t e r  each requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  
i n d i c a t e s  whether  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  c o n t r i b u t e s  toward 
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prevent ing  (P)  t h e  hazard/emergency , o r  toward remedying (R)  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
a f t e r  t h e  haza rd  o r  emergency has  occurred .  Thi; does n o t  r e f e r  t o  whether  
-
o r  n o t  t h e  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e  p reven t s  i n j u r y  o r  damage fo l lowing t h e  
cccurrence  of t h e  hazard  o r  emergency. 
1 .3  HAZARD/EMERGENCY ANALYSIS 
The p a r t i c u l a r  hazard/emergency a n a l y s i s  o r  ana lyses  which o r i g i n a t e d  
each p a r t i c u l a r  requirement o r  g u i d e l i n e ,  is i d e n t i f i e d  by the number o r  
n a & e r / l e t t e r  combination i n  t h e  parentheses  fol lowing each requirement o r  
g u i d e l i n e .  The re fe rence  is t o  Volume I1 of t h i s  r e p o r t ,  Hazzq,-'</Emergency 
Analyses. The hazard/emergency ana lyses  arG. l i s t e d  i n  numerics; o r d e r  i n  
t h a t  volume. A letter,  such as i n  1 .B ,  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i e m e n t  o r  
g u i d e l i n e  appears  ir .  more than one hazardlemergency a n a l y s i s ;  such requ i re -  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s  a r e  l i s t e d  a l p h a b e t i c a l l y  by t h e  i d e n t i f y i n g  l e t t e r  i n  
Volume I1 a t  t h e  beginning of each s e c t i o n .  
1.4 HAZARD REDUCTION PRECEDENCE SEQUENCE 
The requirements and guidel!.nes were developed i n  t h e  hazardlemergency 
ana lyses  by using t h e  hazard  reduc t ion  sequence of OMSF Safe ty  P r o j e c t  Direc- 
t i v e  SPD-1A. The sequence is exp la ined  i n  Volume 11, Hazard/Emergency Analy- 
ses, i n  which i t  is used. The r e s u l t i n g  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  f a l l  
i n t o  f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  as a r e s u l t  of t h i s ,  and they a r e  grouped t o g e t h e r  i n  
t h i s  volume i n t o  f o u r  s e c t i m s ,  as fol lows:  
3.1 Design Requirements and Guidel ines  
3.2 S a f e t y  Devices 
3 . 3  Warning Devices 
3.4 Ope r a t i o n a l  Procedures 
The f o u r  s e c t i o n s  correspond t o  t h e  f i r s t  four  s t e p s  (Numbers 1-4) on t h e  
hazard  r e d u c t i o n  precedence sequence ( s e e  Volume 11) .  Each of  t h e  above f c u r  
s e c t i o n s  t h e r e f o r e  conra ins  a l l  t h e  requi rements  and g u i d e l i n e s  which s a t i s f y  
each of t h e  f o u r  haza rd  reduc t ion  precedence sequence s t e p s ,  as i d e n t i f i e d  
s g a i n s  t each requirement and g u i d e l i n e  i n  t h e  hazard/emergency ana lyses  i n  
Volume 11. 
The i n t e r f a c e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  i n  S e c t i o n  4.0 of t h i s  volume 
have n o t  been s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  t h i s  sequence, because of t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  
numbers. 
1 .5 RES I DUAL HAZARDS 
The las t  s t e p  of t h e  haza rd  reduc t ion  precedence sequence (Nunber 5) c a l l s  
f o r  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a p a r t i c u l a r  haza rd  as a r e s i d u a l  hazard.  Th i s  
occurs  when i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  of personnel  o r  damage t o  o r  l o s s  of  equipment is 
s t i i l  p o s s i b l e  from t h i s  hazard  o r  emergency even when t h e  recommended requ i re -  
men ts end g u i d e l i n e s  have been implemented. 
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Residual hazards were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  hazard/emergency analyses  i n  
Volume 11. These a r e  l i e t e d  i n  Sections 3.5 of t h i s  volume ae appl icab le  t o  
t h e  s h u t t l e  payloads. Tie number i n  parentheses i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  hazardlemer- 
gency ana lys i s  i n  Volume 11. 
Some r e s idua l  hazards a r e  designated ae acceptable  r i r k s .  Theee are 
hazards o r  emergenciaa i n  which the  r i e k ,  a f t e r  implementing t h e  recomended 
requirements and guidel ines ,  l a  smal l  enough t h a t  no f u r t h e r  ac t ion  i e  con- 
s ide red  necessary. 
Other r e s idua l  hazards are labeled with t h e  tern SRT Requirementa. This 
m a n e  t h a t  Supporting Research and Technology (SRT) requirements have been 
i d e n t i f i e d  t o  a i d  i n  resolving these  tazards .  Theee SRT requiremanto are de- 
s c r ibed  i n  Volume 11. 
The remaining r e s idua l  hrzarde are designated as unresolved oafe ty  i s sues .  
These are  hazard^ o r  emergencies f o r  which t h e  r e s i d u a l  r i e k  ( a f t e r  impla- 
menting t h e  recommmded requirements and guidel ines)  is  no t  acceptable ,  and for  
which no adequate means f o r  reso lv ing  the  I ssue  (cruch as def ining support ing 
research and technology requirements) has been i d e n t i f i e d .  
It i r  suggested t h a t  procedures rhould be  set up i n  the course of a program 
f o r  t h e  per iod ic  review of  r e s idua l  hazarde, Di f fe ren t  l e v e l s  of management 
should be involved, wi th  t h e  lowest l e v e l  reviewing the  acceptable r i s k s ,  and 
the  unresolved s a f e t y  iesues  being exposed t o  t h e  h ighes t  management l eve l .  
2.0 BASELINE MODEL 
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The b a s e l i n e  model c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s e s  i nc luded  t h e  v e h i c l e s  shown 
i n  F igu re  1. 










Figure  1. Veh ic l e s  Considered 
I n i t i a l  a n a l y s i s  was based  on t h e  i n t e g r a l  t ank  s k u t t  l e  o r b i t e r ,  b u t  
emphasis was later  s w i t c h e d  t o  t h e  drop  tank  o r b i t e r  a s  t h i s  concept  developed. 
The a s s m p t i c n s  made were b road  enough t h a t  no  r e s u l t s  were i n v a l i j a t e d  by 
t h i s  change. 
Si-ut t l e  pay loads  c o n s i d e r e d  i n c l u d e d  manned and unmanned s o r t  ie  payloads  
( i . e . ,  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ) ,  s a te l l i t e s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and 
p o t e n t i a l  upysr  s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  used t o  d e l i v e r  unmanned payioads  t o  o r b i t s  
beyond t h e  o r b i t e r  's capab ili ties.  
Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  i n c i d :  d t h e  fo l lowing:  
. Agena 
. Centaur  
. T r a n s t a g e  
. Burner  I1 
. Apol lo  S e r v i c e  Module 
. O r b i t - t o a r b i t  S h u t t l e  (00s) /Tug 
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These were considere 1 .IS t y p i c a l  of p o t e n t i a l  upper s t a g e  veh ic les  i n  
order  t o  i d e n t i f y  poten t i a  haza rds .  They were only considered a s  they opt?r- 
a t e d  i n  o r  n e a r  t h e  o r b i t e r  w h i l e  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  
A t y p i c a l  s h u t t l e  d s s i o n ,  genera ted  from N R  Phase B s h u t t l e  d a t a ,  i s  
shown i n  Figure 2. The boxed a r e a  shows t h e  mission phases cons idered  i n  
t h e  s tudy.  Only p o t e n t i a l  hazards  occur r ing  i n  t h e s e  on-orbi t  phases have 
been considered.  S o r t i e  modules, s a t e l l i t e s  and u m e r  s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  were 
ccns idered  and hazards  i d e n t i f i e d  only  w h i l e  t h e s e  v e h i c l e s  were t r a n s p o r t e d  
i n  o r b i t ,  deployed and r e t r i e v e d  by t h e  o r b i t e r ,  o r  opera ted  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  
of t h e  o r b i t e r .  
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Figure  2 .  Typ ica l  S h u t t l e  Mission 
The space s t a t i o n s  cons idered  were modular s t a t i o n s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  
o r b i t  and assembled by t h e  o r b i t e r .  I n i t i a l  6-man ve r s ions  and growth v e r s i o n s  
wi th  up t c  1 2  men, a s  def ined i n  r e c e n t  Phase B s t u d i e s ,  were s tud ied .  Assembly 
of the  space  s t a t i o n ,  independent o p e r a t i o n  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and normal resupply  
by t h e  o r b i t e r  were considered.  
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PART I - SORTIE PAYLOADS 
1-3.0 SAFETY REQUIFWENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This section contains safety requirement? and guidelines developed 
from analyses of specif ic  safety issues, The requirements and guidelines 
are grouped into f ive  sub-sections, corresponding to the five steps of 
the hazard reduction precedence sequence. These ff  ve sub-sections are : 
1-3.1 Design Requirements and Guidelines 
1-3.2 Safety Devices 
1-3.3 Warning Devices 
1-3.4 Operational Procedures 
1-3.5 Residual Hazards 
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1-3.1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
Hazardous Paxloads 
Toxic flammable corrosive  f l u i d  containers  s h a l l  be  located i n  
unpressurized volumes of preseur ized payloads, o r  s h a l l  be 
double contained with the  c a p a b i l i t y  of dumping the  f l u i d  t o  
space o r  off-loading t o  another double conta iner ,  and of venting 
the  space between the  two conta iners  t o  space. (RP-1.Y, 1.2,001) (1-5.1) 
1-3.1.2 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  ~ r o v i d e d  t o  purge o r  dump t o  space a 
t o x i s a l l y  contaminated o r  corrosive  atmosphere i n  a pressur '  ~ e d  
o r b i t e r  payload. (RR-1. d , 1.2.001) 
1-3.1.3 Capabi l i ty  t o  r e l ea se ,  e j e c t ,  o r  extend t h e  payload s h a l l  be  
provided s o  as t o  prevent damage t o  the  o r b i t e r  a t  the  expense 
of the  pavload. (RR-1. h , 1.2.002) 
1-3.1.4 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent  and 
dump pressur ized,  flammable o r  hazardous payload f l u i d s  t o  
space wi th in  t he  time cons t r a in t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  
This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be ava i l ab l e  with the  cargo bay doors 
open o r  closed.  (RR-1, i , 1.2.002) 
1-3.1.5 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  switch of f  a l l  e l a c t r i c a l  loads 
t o  payload from t h e  o r b i t e r .  (RP-1. j , 1.2.002) 
1-3.1.6 F i re  and hea t  r e s i s t a n t  p ro t ec t ion  of o r b i t e r  t o  payload command 
and ins t rumentat ion i n t e r f a c e s  s h a l l  be provided. (RP-1.m , 1.2.002) (1-5.2) 
1-3.1.7 I g n i t i o n  sources i n  the  o r b i t e r  bay, such a s  switches and 
r e l ays ,  s h a l l  be sea led  o r  otherwise contained s o  as t o  prevent 
i g n i t i o n  of flammable f l u i d s .  (RP-1.n , 1.2.002) 
1-3.1.8 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  automat ical ly  shu t  o f f  forced 
a i r  c i r c u l a t i o n  i n  a pressur ized o r b i t e r  payload upon de t ec t ion  
of a f i r e .  (RR-1.2.003) (1-5.3) 
1-3.1.9 Mater ia ls  used i n  pressur ized payloads s h a l l  be sub jec t  t o  the  
same flammability con t ro l  procedures a s  those used wi th in  t h e  
o r b i t e r  p ressur ized  volumes. (RR-1.2.003) 
I-3.1.10 Access f o r  v i s u a l  inspec t ion  by in t r aveh icu la r  act iv ;  t y  o r  
remotely by ins t rumentat ion s h a l l  be  provided t o  a l l  primary 
s t r u c t u r e  of pressur ized payloads while i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay. (GR-1.2.004) 
1-3.1.11 The f a c t o r s  of s a f .  t y  of pressure  ves se l s  while i n  o r  near  t he  
o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  equal  t o  the  o r b i t e r  tank f a c t o r s  
of s a f e ty .  (CP-1,2.005) 
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1-3.1.12 Gaseous content  of p ressur ized  tanks s h a l l  be smal l  enough s o  
t h a t  r ap id  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
w i l l  no t  r e s u l t  i n  averpressure .  (RR-1.2.005) 
1-3.1.13 Tanks s h a l l  b e  designed s o  t h a t  f a iLure  due t o  overpressure  
w i l l  no t  pzcduce sh rapne l .  R - 1  1 1 . 0 0 1 )  (1-5.4) 
1-3.1.14 Pressur ized  tanks  s h a l l  be l oca t ed  o r  p ro t ec t ed  by sh r apne l  
proof b a r r i e r s  s o  t h a t  explos ion of one w i l l  n o t  propagate t o  
o the r s .  (RR-1.2.005) 
1-3.1.15 Presnur i :  d tanks  s h a l l  be loca ted  o r  provided wi th  sh rapne l  
pronf bar i  i e r s  s o  t h a t  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartments 
and c q : l i p m ~ ~ t  r equ i r ed  f o r  o r b i t e r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  w i l l  b e  
p ro tec tc  d ;n t h e  even t  of  a tank explos ion.  (RR-1.2.005) 
1-3.1.16 Plumbing connections for hazardous f l u i d  t r a n s f e r  i n  p ressur iznd  
a r ea s  s h a l l  be  double contained wi th  t he  c e y a b i l i t y  of  ven t ing  
the  s p a c  between t h e  two con t a ine r s  t o  space.  (RR-1.3.002) 
- 3 . 1 1 7  Cargo beyond t h e  1in;its allowed fc: hand t r a n s f e r  s h a l l  be  
t r a n s f e r r e d  on guide r a i l s  o r  o t h e r  mechanisms which p o s i t i v e l y  
cons t r a in  t h e  angular  and l i n e a r  no t ion  of the  cargo except  
i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o c  of motion. (RP-l.3.002)(1-5.5) 
I-3.1.18 Cargo hand1l:lg .;.lechanisms s h a l l  al low f o r  s toppage of  t he  motion, 
r e v e r s a l  c-: t h e  motion, o r  r e l e a s e  of t he  cargo a t  any po in t  
along t he  t r a n s f e r  path.  (RP-l.dd , 1.3.002) 
1-3.1.19 Cargo handl ing mechanisms s h a l l  be  designed t o  wi ths tand t he  
propulsiv:e f o r ce s  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from a l e ak i cg  o r  rup tu red  
f l u i d  cargo. (RR-l.h\ , 1.3.002) 
1-3.1.20 Separa te  l i n e s  s h a l l  be used f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of f u e l  and 
ox id i ze r .  (RR-1.3.003) 
1-3.1.21 Automatic and/or  crew con t ro l l ed  emergency means s h a l l  be 
provided f o r  s h u t t i n g  o f f  power and a r r e s t i n g  the  motion of 
cargo t r a n s f e r  mechanisms. (RR-1.3 .OO4) 
1-3.1.22 Cargo s h a l l  be  packaged dur ing t r a n s f e r  FO as t o  have no exposed 
sharp  edges o r  corners .  (RR-1.3.004) 
1-3.1.23 C r e w  con t ro l l ed  cargo t t a n s f e r  v e l o c i t y  s h a l l  be  l i m i t e d  s o  
t h a t  the  carbo can a t  a l l  times be  stopped w i th in  t h e  v i s i b l e  
range. (RP-1.3.004) 
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1-3.1.24 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  rap id ly  evacuste personnel from 
and s e a l  o f f  rad ioac t ive ly  contaminated modules u n t i l  they can 
be re turned t o  ea r th .  (RR-1.3.005) 
1-3.1.25 Means s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e  f o r  decontaminating equipment and 
personnel exposed t o  rad ioac t ive  mater ia l  and f o r  s t o r i n g  
and re turn ing  t o  e a r t h  rad ioac t ive ly  contaminated c lo th ing  
and o ther  mater ia l .  (RR-1.3.005) 
On-Board Su rv ivab i l i t v  - 
1-3.1.26 Normally hab i t ab l e  compartments of more than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  
i n  volume s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  a reas  which provide 
f o r  personnel  su rv iva l .  These e x i t s  s h a l l  be  a t  l e a s t  3 m 
(10 f t )  a p a r t .  (RR-3.C, 3.1.001) 
1-3.1.27 Flammable, explosive o r  gas generat ing mater ia l  s h a l l  be loca ted  
s o  t h a t  the  energy content  which can be propagated a t  any one 
loca t ion  s h a l l  not  r e s u l t  i n  overpressur iza t ion  of t he  canpart- 
ment from h e a t  and gas production. (RR-3.D, 3.1.001) 
1-3.1.28 Flammable, explosive o r  gas generating mater ia l  wi th in  3 m (10 f t )  
of t he  entrance t o  compartments wi th  only one en t ry l eg re s s  path 
s h a l l  be l imi t ed  s o  t h a t  the  energy content ,  i f  re leased ,  w i l l  
no t  r e s u l t  i n  damage o r  an environment which prevents s h i r t s l e e v e  
access through the  entrance.  (RR-3.E , 3,1.001) 
I-3.1.29 Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided on manned s o r t i e  modules 
f o r  the r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  the  passengers i n  the s o r t i e  
module, without l i f e  support  from t h e  o r b i t e r .  (GR-3.H 9 3.1.002) 
1-3.1.30 lbo o r  more entrances  i n t o  normally hab i t ab l e  compartments of more 
. than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  i n  v o l m e  s h a l l  be s h i r t s l e e v e  access ib le  
from each of t h e  o t h e r  normally inhabi ted compartments. These 
entrances  s h a l l  be at least 3 m (10 f t )  apar t .  (RR-3.1.002) 
I-3.1.31 Where only one s h i r t s l e e v e  ing re s s l eg re s s  path is provided i n t o  
a compartment o r  module, redundant means s h a l l  be ava i l ab l e  f o r  
opening the  connecting hatch(es)  from e i t h e r  s i d e .  (PR-?.1.005) 
1-3.1.32 Manned s o r t i e  modules and space s t a t i o n  modules s h a l l  be designed 
s o  t h a t  they can be undocked, r e t r i eved  i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay and re turned t o  e a r t h  unpressurized. (GR-3.1 .OO7) 
1-3.1.33 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  depressur ize  docked modules 
before  undocking. (RR-3.1.007) 
SAFETY DEVICES 
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Hazardous Payloads 
Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  s u s t a i n  personnel  when 
i n  a manned payload,  fo l lowing d e t e c t i o n  of a ~ G X ~ C  environment i n  
t h e  payload,  u n t i l  escape i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  can b e  e f f e c t e d .  
(RR-l.b, Lum) 
S p e c i a l  p r o t e c t i v e  garments and equipment s h a l l  be  provided f o r  
personnel  working i n  a t o x i c  envfronment o r  n r a r  p o t e n t i a l l y  t o x i c  
payload elements .  (RP-1. c ,  1.2.001) 
Manually and =motely c o n t r o l l e d  means s h a l l  be  provided i n  
p r e s s u r i z e d  o r b i t e r  payloads f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  and e x t i n g u i s h i c g  
f f  r e s  . (RR-1.2.003) 
Emergency l i f e  suppor t  s h a l l  be  provide4 f o r  a l l  personnel  i n  
manned o r b i t e r  payloads s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a l low them t i m e  t o  c o n t r o l  
a f i r e  and/or  escape t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  (RR-1.2.003) 
C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided t o  r e l i e v e  atmospheric  p r e s s u r e  from 
an o r b i t e r  payload s o  a s  t o  prevent  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  beyond t h e  pay- 
load  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s .  This  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  automat ic  when 
t h e  payload is n o t  manned, and under c o n t r o l  of t h e  occupants  when 
manned. The maximum dump r a t e  s h a l l  not  exceed t h e  ven t ing  capa- 
b i l i t y  of t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay wi th  t h e  cargo bay doors  c losed .  
(RR-1.2.003) 
Means s h a l l  b e  provided f o r  t h e  l o c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r a d i a n t  o r  
o t h e r  type  of h e a t  remotely o r  by personnel  i n  I V A  o r  EVA a c t i v i t y  
t o  evapora te  accumulat ions of f r o z e n  f l u i d s  from c r i t i c a l  a reas .  (1.2.004) (1-5 6) 
Rel ie f  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided f o r  p r e s s u r i z e d  tanks  which 
au tomat ica l ly  l i m i t  niaximum pressure .  Venting s h a l l  b e  t o  space  or  
t o  a tank a t  lower ; . ? s s u r e ,  and s h a l l  be  arranged so t h a t  mutual ly  
r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion.  
(RP-1.2.005) 
Hazardous f l u i d s  o r  materials s h a l l  be  double conta ined dur ing  
handl ing  and t r a n s f e r  i n  p r e s s u r i z e d  areas. C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  
provided t o  v e r i f y  the  i n t e g r i t y  of both c o n t a i n e r s  b e f o r e  and 
a f t e r  t r a n s f e r .  (RP-1.0, 1..3.001) (1-5.7) 
Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  b e  provided t o  vent  t h e  space  between double 
c o n t a i n e r s  f o r  hazardous f l u i d  handl ing  t o  space  and f o r  dumping 
t h e  f l u i d  t o  space  o r  off-1oadir.g t o  a n o t h e r  con ta ine r .  (RP-l.p, 1.3.001) 
Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  s u s t a i n  pe r sonne l  when i n  
a manned payload, fo l lowing d e t e c t i o n  of a t o x i c  environment i n  the  
payload, u n t i l  escape i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  can be e f f e c t e d .  (RR-lab, 1.2.001) 
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1-3.2.11 Specia l  p ro t ec t ive  garments and equipment s h a l l  be provided f o r  
personnel working i n  a t ox i c  environment o r  near  p o t e n t i a l l y  
t ox i c  payload elements. (RR- lac ,  1.2.00i) 
1-3.2.12 Packaging of hand-carried cargo s h a l l  be provided with mul t ip le  
hand holds,  s h a l l  al iow forward v i s i b i l i t y  by the  con t ro l l i ng  
personnel,  and s h a l l  be  capable of surv iv ing  impact aga ins t  a 
sharp ob jec t  a t  3 m/sec (10 f t / s e c ) .  (W-1.2a t,.,3.001) (1-5.8) 
1-3.2.13 Provisions s h a l l  be made f o r  rap id ly  secur ing hand-carried cargo 
t o  var ious  s t r u c t u r a l  point6 along the  t r a n s f e r  path  s o  a s  t a  
prevent l o s s  of con t ro l  of t h e  cargo i n  th-2 event of an emergency. 
(w-1 .bbc 1.3e001) 
1-3.2.14 Corrosive f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  s h a l l  be double contained during 
handling and t r a n s f e r  i n  unpressurized a reas .  Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  
be provided t o  v e r i f y  t he  i n t e g r i t y  of both conta iners  before  
and a f t e r  t r ans fe r .  (RP-1.3.003) 
1-3.2.15 Cargo of more than 45 kg (100 l b )  mass, o r  hazardous cargo s h a l l  
be te thered  a t  a l l  times during handling and t r a n s f e r  i n  pressur- 
ized a reas  e i t h e r  t o  the  spacecraf t  s t r u c t u r e  or  t o  the  t r a n s f e r  
mechanism s o  a s  t o  l i m i t  t he  poss ib le  t r a v e l  of t he  cargo following 
a f a i l u r e  of the  primary cargo a t t a c h  mechanism. (RR-1.3.004) (1-5 . 9) 
1-3.2.16 Spare shie lded conta iners  s h a l l  be ava i l ab l e  i n  which rad ioac t ive  
ma te r i a l s  can be temporarily s to red  i n  t he  event of an accident .  
(RR-1.3. ~O5)(1-5,14) 
1-3.2.17 Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  l oca t ing  r ad ioac t ive  ma te r i a l  which 
has been inadver ten t ly  re leased  i n  a module. (RR-1.3.005) (1-5.14) 
On-Board Su rv ivab i l i  t v  
1-3.2.18 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  reduce the  pressure  i n  each com- 
partment s u f f i c i e n t l y  , o r  increase  i t  i n  t h e  ad jo in ing  compart- 
m e n t ( ~ )  and t o  c u t  o f f  a i r  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  s o  t h a t  i n  an emergency 
the  atmosphere i n  the  a f f e c t e d  compartment w i l l  not  be propagated 
i n t o  adjoining compartments. This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  cont ro l led  
remotely from each compartment. (RR-3.A , 3.1.001) 
1-3.2.19 Automatic vent ing c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided i n  each comparment 
s o  t h a t  i n  the  event of  a f i r e  o r  release of gases wi th in  t he  
compartment t h e  pressure  w i l l  no t  exceed t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s  
of the  s t r u c t u r e  o r  the  c a p a b i l i t y  of s e a l s  t o  o the r  compartments 
t o  exclude the  contaminated atmosphere. (RR-3.B, 3.1.001) 
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1-3.2.20 Pressure s u i t s  and attendant l i f e  support sha l l  b e  provided for 
a l l  orbiter/sort ie  module passengers on missions where the con- 
figuration does not provide two separate pressurizable compartments 
capable of returning all passengers t o  earth. (RR-3.1.004) 
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i-3.3 WARNING DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloado 
1-3.3.1 Double contained tox ic  flammable or  corrosive  f l.uid conta iners  
s h a l l  be provided with means t o  d e t e c t  leakage of t he  t ox i c  f l a w  
mable o r  corrosiv?e f l u i d  i n t o  the  spqce between the  conta iners ,  
and with means t o  d e t e c t  pene t ra t ion  of t he  ou t s ide  conta iner -  
m-12, L3.001) 
1-3.3.2 Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  de t ec t ing  a tox ic  flammable o r  oxygen 
enriched environment i n  pressur ized o r b i t e r  payloads containing 
toxdr,, p o t e n t i a l l y  tox ic ,  flammable o r  oxygen enriched f l u i d s .  
(m- l .a ,  1.2.001) (1-5.10) 
1-3.3.3 Capabil i ty s h a l l  be  provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
measurement of f l u i d  pressures ,  temperatures, tank s t r a i n s ,  or  
o ther  means. (RP-l.F, 1.1.001) 
1-3.3.4 Means s h a l l  be prcvided f o r  de t ec t ing  t h e  presence of s p i l l e d  
hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  while being handled o r  t r ans fe r r ed  
between pressur ized modules. (GR-1. t, 1.3.002) 
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1-3.4 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
I-3.4.1 Procedures s h a l l  be ava i l ab l e  f o r  handling and t r a n s f e r r i n g  
hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  i n  a pressur ized a r ea  from a s ing ly  
penetra ted double conta iner  t o  a s to rage  container  without re leas-  
i ng  f l u i d  o r  ma te r i a l  t o  the spacecraf t  atmosphere. (RP-1.3.001) 
1-3.4.2 Manual ha~ld l ing  and t r a n s f e r  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  mate r ia l s  s h a l l  
be c a r r i e d  out  by two o r  more personnel who s h a l l  havs no o the r  
d u t i e s  during t h i s  operat ion.  (RP-l.u, 1.3.001) (I-5.11! 
1-3.4 .3  During handling and t r a n s f e r  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  n a t e r i a l s ,  
no o the r  manned operat ions  s h a l l  be planned along the  t r a n s f e r  
path.  (RP-1.v , 1.3,001) ( I - S J l )  
1-3 .4 .4  Mutually r eac t ive  f l u i d s  s h a l l  nor be handled o r  t r ans fe r r ed  
sJ.multaneously. (m-low, 1.3.001) (1-5.12) 
1-3.4.5 The pressures ,  temperatures, o r  o the r  parameters which i n d i c a t e  
t he  s t a t u s  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  shall b e  v e r i f i e d  
before  they a r e  t ranspor ted.  (RP-l.x, 1.3.001) 
1-3.4.6 Emergency procedures s h a l l  be ava i l ab l e  f o r  handling, containing,  
and disposing of s p i l l e d  hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  s o  a s  t o  
safeguard the  personnel,  o r b i t e r  and payload, i n  t h a t  order.  
(RR-1.3.001) 
I-3.4,7 Transfer  l i n e s  f o r  hazardous f l u i d s  s h a l l  be loca ted  ou ts ide  of 
pressur ized ves se l s  o r  s h a l l  be double walled wi th  t he  capab i l i t y  
of vent ing the  space between the  two conta iners  t o  space. 
(RR-1.3.002) 
1-3.4.8 Transfer  l i n e s  i n  pressur ized a r eas ,  including double walled 
l i n e s ,  s h a l l  be purged a f t e r  the  transfer of hazardous f l u i d s  
. and before  breaking plumbing connections. (RP-1.3.002) 
1-3.6.9 Emergency procedures s h a l l  be available f o r  the  r e l ea se ,  handling 
and t r anspor t a t i on  of remotely cont ro l led  cargo i n  the event G E  
f a i l u r e  of :he handling mechanism, o r  of damage t o  t k . 4  packaging 
of the cargo. (GP-1. gg , 1.3,002) 
1-3.4.10 Transfer  l i n e s  in unpreesurized a reas  s h a l l  be purged a f t e r  the  
t r a n s f e r  of hazardous f l u i d s ,  (RP*1.3.003) 
1-3.4.11 Emergency procedures dm11  be ava i l ab l e  f o r  re leas ing  cargo which 
has become jammed i n  htches o r  o the r  r e s t r i c t e d  a r eas  without 
causing damage t o  the  spacecraf t  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment, !RR-1.3.004) 
(1-5 ,l3) 
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1-3.4.12 Hand ca r r i ed  cargo s h a l l  be l imi ted t o  45 kg (100 l b )  mass, pro- 
vided the  cen te r  of mass i~ within  35 cms (14 ins . )  o t  the  hand- 
hold. Cargo which exceedr these  l i m i t s  s h a l l  be t ranspor ted with 
mechanical a s s i s t .  (RP-1.y , 1.3.001) (1-5.9) 
I-3.4.U Cargo i n  which a rupture  o r  leakage through the  conta iners  would 
r e s u l t  i n  uncontrolled motion of the  cargo because of propuls ive  
forces  beyond a &-ingle man's capab i l i t y  t o  con t ro l  o r  because 
t o x i c i t y  r e q u i r a  immediate abandonment and evacuatior. of the  
a r ea  s h a l l  not be  hand-carried. (GR-1. z, l,3,OOl) 
1-3.4.14 The t r a n s f e r  of cargo with mechanical a s a i s t  s h a l l  e i t h e r  be 
v i s u a l l y  monitored hy personnel who a r e  f r e e  of o the r  d u t i e s ,  
o r  s h a l l  b e  provided with jensing devices which automst ical ly  
s t o p  the  motion i f  t he  cargo i n t e r f a c e s  wi th  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equip- 
ment. (RP-l.ee, 1.3.002) 
1-3.4.15 Personnel s h a l l  not be loca ted  during cargo t r a n s f e r  In  pos i t i ons  
which can r e s u l t  i n  t h e i r  entrapment i f  the  cargo t r a n s f e r  mechan- 
i s m  f a i l s ,  (RR-l .ff ,  103.002) 
O Y ~  Board ' Surv ivab i l i t y  
1-3.4.16 The o r b i t e r  crew s h a l l  not  e n t e r  manned s o r t i e  modules during 
the  conduct of hazardous experiutcnts, (RR-3.1.002) 
1-3.4.17 Pereonnel s h a l l  no t  be allowed i n  a s o r t i e  o r  space s t a t i o n  
module during repos i t ion ing  of the  module from one docking 
p o r t  t o  another. (RR-3.1 .OO6) 
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1-3'5 RESIDUAL HAZARDS 
Exposure of t he  a h u t t l e  crew o r  
passengers t o  a t o x i c  envirotment  
re leased  from a ve s se l  i n  the  payload 
con ta in ing  a t o x i c  f l u i d .  (1.2.001) 
A f i r e  i n  the  cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  f r o n  
r e l e a s e  and i g n i t i o n  of a flammable 
f l u i d  i n  an unpressur ized payload. 
(1.2.002) 
A f i r e  i n  a p ressur ized  pay3.oad i n  t h e  
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from r e l e a s e  and 
i g n i t i o n  of a flammable f l u i d .  (1.2.003 
A co r ro s ive  environment i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  
cargo bag r e s u l t i n g  from leakage o r  
r up tu r e  of a payload ve s se l  con ta in ing  
a co r ro s ive  Fluid. (1.2.094) 
An explos ion i n  the  s h u t t l e  cargo hay 
of a p o t e n t i a l l y  exp los ive  payload 
ve s se l .  (1.2. OM) 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  
o r  ma t e r i a l  dur ing manual t r a n s f e r  i n  
p ressur ized  modules. (1.3.001) 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage of  hazardous f l u i d s  
o r  materials dur ing  mechanical 1.y 
a s s i s t e d  o r  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  presc-  
u r i z ed  modules. (1.7.002) 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage of  hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  dur ing  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
unpressur ized a rea .  (1.3.003) 
A r a d i o a c t i v e  environment i n  a - o r t i e  
module or apace s t a t i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  
f r im exposure o r  escape of r a d i o a c t i v e  
amterf a l  dur ing  t r a n s f e r  and handling 
of r a d i o a c t i v e  materials. (1.3.005) 
- Acceptable 
R i ~ k  
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1-4.0 INTERFACE SAFETY REQUREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This section contains interface safety  requirements and guidelines 
required by the s o r t i e  payloads t o  be applied i n  interfacing vehicles .  
These interface requirements and guidelines were devtloped from analyses 
o i  spec i f i c  safety i s sues ,  and are grouped i n  th i s  sect ion by interfacing 
vehicle ,  as f  oliows : 
1-4.1 Earth Orbital Shuttle 
Space Division 
North kmercan Rockwell 
1-4.1 EARTH 3RBITAL SHUTTLE 
Hazardous Payloads 
1-4.1.1 Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  v i s u a l  i n spec t i on  of an o r b i t e r  
payload before  i n i t i a t i n g  r e t r i e v a l  and loading i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. (RP-1.1.015) 
1-4.1.2 P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  s h a l l  be provided t o  t he  or bite^: crew t h a t  a 
r e t r i e v e d  payload has  been p roper ly  secured i n  t h e  cargo bay before  
c l o s ing  t he  cargo bay doors.  (RP-1.1.015) 
1-4.1.3 Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  i s o l a t e  o r b i t e r  environmental 
c o n t r o l  system from payload t o  prevent  t o x i c  fumes from encer ing  
t he  o r b i t e r .  (RR-1.2.003) 
1-4.1.4 Access f o r  v i s u a l  i n spec t i on  by i n t r a v e h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y  o r  remotely 
by ins t rumenta t ion  s h a l l  be provided t o  a l l  primary s t r u c t u r e  in- 
s i d e  t h e  cargo bay o r  equipment i n  t h e  cargo bay requ i red  f o r  r e t u r n  
t o  e a r t h .  (GR-1.2.004) 
On-Boatd S u r v i v a b i l i t y  
1-4.1.5 The o r b i t e r  crew s h a l l  no t  e n t e r  manned s o r t i e  modules dur ing 
t h e  conduct of hazardous experiments.  (RR-3.1.002) 
1-4.1.6 P r e s su re  s u i t s  and a t t e n d a n t  l i f e  suppor t  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  
a l l  o r b i t e r l s o r t i e  module passengers on missions where t h e  con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  does no t  provide  two s e p a r a t e  p r e s s u r i z a b l e  compart- 
ments capable of r e t u rn ing  a l l  passengers t o  e a r t h .  (RR-3.1.004) 
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1-5.0 RATIONALE FOR REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This  s e c t i o n  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  some of t h e  requirements  and 
gu ide l ines .  This  d i s c u s s i o n  is confined t o  c a s e s  i n  which t h e  r a t i o n a l e  may 
no t  be  obvious,  o r  where some c l a r i f y i n g  exp lana t ion  a r e  i n  o rde r .  The 
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  fo l lows t h e  o r d e r  of t h e  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s ,  
and r e f e r e n c e  is made i n  pa ren theses ,  where a p p r o p r i a t e ,  t o  s p e c i f i c  requi re-  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s .  
Wherever a  f l u i d  can c r e a t e  an immediate hazard  i f  r e l e a s e d  
from i t s  c o n t a i n e r  i n t o  a  p r e s s 1   zed environment,  double 
containment is recommended. This  impl ies  a  double f a i l w e  
t o  r e s u l t  i n  a  hazardous r e l e a s e  of t h e  f l u i d .  I n  o r d e r  t o  
ensure  t h a t  t h i s  redundancy is a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  volume between 
t h c  double c o n t a i n e r s  must b e  monitored f o r  leakage.  Venting 
c a p a b i l i t y  is necessary  t o  a l low t h e  o u t s i d e  c o n t a i n e r  t o  be  
of r e s o n a b l y  l ight -weight  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  (1-3.1.1) 
Thermal i n s u l a t i o n  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  r a d i a t i o n  from a 
f i r e  and t o  reduce h e a t  conduction i n t o  s t r u c t u r e  and equip- 
ment would cons iderably  reduce t h e  hazard from a f i r e  i n  t h e  
cargo bay. This  is no t  g e n e r a l l y  cons idered  f e a s i b l e ,  how- 
e v e r ,  because of t h e  weight and volume c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and is  
only recommended f o r  e s s e n t i a l  ins t rumenta t ion .  (1-3.1.6) 
One of t h e  most e f f e c t i  .re means f o r  con ta in ing  a f i r e  i n  
zero-g is t o  e l i m i n a t e  convect ion c u r r e n t s ,  t h u s  c u t t i n g  
down t h e  flow of f r e s h  oxygen t o  t h e  f i r e .  Forced a i r  
c i r c u l a t i o n  should be c u t  o f f  immediately ii a f i r e  is 
d e t e c t e d .  and c a p a b i l i t y  t o  do t h i s  automatical1.y should  
b e  provided i n  case  t h e  payload is  unmanned a t  t h e  t i m e .  
(1-3.1.8) 
The s ta te-of- the-ar t  is approaching t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  des ign  
p r e s s u r e  tanks  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  mode when overpressur ized  
does n c t  produce sh rapne l .  This  can be  done, f o r  example, by 
using a p p r o p r i a t e l y  l a r g e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y ,  o r  by us ing  
a p p r o p r i a t e l y  Ip rge  f a c t o r s  9f s a f e t y ,  dr by us ing  f i b e r g l a s s  
wound tanks .  Shrapnel  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  c a t a s t r o p l ~ i c  t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r ,  and use  of sh rapne l - f ree  tanks  would t h e r e f o r e  be  
h igh ly  d e s i r a b l e .  Because t h e r e  is  s t i l l  doubt about t h e  
p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of achieving t h i s ,  i t  is c a l l e d  o u t  a s  ?, 
g u i d e l i n e  r a t h e r  than a requirem- ~t . (1-3.1.13) 
Cargo t r a n s f e r r e d  wi th  mechanical a s s i s t  should no t  b e  un- 
r e s t r a i n e d  a t  r i g h t  ang les  t o  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of motion, s i n c e  
t h i s  could r e s u l t  i n  damage by impact. (1-3.1.17) 
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I f  a c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d  l e a k s  i n  t h e  cargo bay, expansion and 
evapora t ion  may cause some of t h e  f l u i d  t o  f r e e z e ,  p o s s i b l y  
a t t a c h e d  t o  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment. This  may remain f rozen  
u n t i l  re-entry o r  landing,  when t h e  s o l i d  may m e l t  and 
i n c r e a s e  i t s  c o r r o s i v e  a c t i o n .  Means f o r  applying h e a t  t o  
any s o l i d i f i e d  f l u i d s  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  r equ i red ,  poss ib ly  by 
I V A  o r  EVA personnel ,  t o  evapora te  and d i s p e r s e  t h e  f rozen  
f l u i d s .  (I-3.2.6j 
I t  should t a k e  a t  l e a s t  a  double f a i l u r e  t o  r e s u l t  i n  release 
of hazardous f l u i d s  dur ing  cargo t r a n s f e r .  Double conta in-  
ment is t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e d ,  wi th  means t o  v e r i f y  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  
of both  c o n t a i n e r s  s o  a s  t o  ensure  t h e  requ i red  redundancy. 
(1-3.2.8) 
The maximum speed a t  which any p i e c e  of hand-carried cargo may 
be  p r o p e l l e d ,  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o r  by a c c i d e n t ,  has been es t ima ted  
on human f a c t o r s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  be  3  m/sec (10 f t / s e c ) .  
Cargo should be designed t o  s u r v i v e  such an impact. An a l t e x -  
n a t i v e  means of s p e c i f y i n g  t h i s  l i m i t  could be  by d e f i n i n g  
t h e  momentum of t h e  package, thus  a l lowing f o r  an i n v q r s e  
v a r i a t i o n  of v e l o c i t y  wi th  mass. (1.3.2.12) 
L imi ta t ions  should be  p laced on t h e  mass and i n e r t i a s  of hand- 
c a r r i e d  cargo.  The b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  has been used,  b u t  
t h e s e  l i m i t s  should  be  updated i f  b e t t e r  human f a c t o r s  d a t a  
become a v a i l a b l e .  (1-3.2.15, 1-3.4.12) 
Toxic f l u i d s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  t o x i c  when i n  a  gaseous o r  f i n e l y  
d iv ided  form. A t o x i c  ent ironment  is t h e r e f o r e  cons idered  
d e t e c t a b l e ,  e.g., by a  gas ana lyze r .  By c o n t r a s t ,  c o r r o s i v e  
f l u i d s  g e n e r a l l y  a c t  i n  a l i q u i d  form and cannot p r a c t i c a l l y  
be de tec ted .  (1-3.3.2) 
The "buddy" system i s  recommended when hazardous f l u i d s  o r  
m a t e r i a l  is  being handled s o  t h a t  one man can come t o  t h e  
a s s i s t a n c e  of t h e  o t h e r  i n  t h e  event  of an acc iden t  o r  
problem. Handling of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  should 
be a  ded ica ted  t a s k ,  s o  as n o t  t o  a l low a  problem t o  occur  
because of i n t e r f e r e n c e  wi th  o t h e r  t a s k s .  (I-3.4.2., 1-3.4.3) 
A s i n g l e  acc iden t  could damage two o r  more c o n t a i n e r s .  
Mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  should t h e r e f o r e  not  be  handled 
toge the r .  (1-3.4.4) 
1-5.13 Jamming of cargo i n  doors ,  ha tches  o r  o t h e r  r e s t r i c t e d  a r e a s  
can r e s u l t  i n  s e v e r e  l o s s  o r  damage i f  not  handled w i t h  
method and pa t i ence .  Procedures f o r  r e l e a s i n g  such cargo 
should  be  developed ahead of time. C z r t a i n  t o o l s  o r  o t h e r  
a i d s  may a l s o  be  found necessary  by developing these  pro- 
cedures.  (1-3.4.11) 
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1-5.14 R e l a t i v e l y  few uses  of r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  
planned f o r  s o r t i e  and so la r -a r ray  powered space  s t a t i o n  
miss ions .  However, Atomic Engergy Commission r e g u l a t i o n s  
c a l l  f o r  s t r i c t  s a f e t y  measures t o  keep c o n t r o l  of t h e  
r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l ,  and t o  minimize t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
exposing t h e  g e n e r a l  popu la t ion  on e a r t h  t o  e x c e s s i v e  
r a d i a t i o n  as a r e s u l t  of an a c c i d e n t .  (1-3.2.16, 1-3.2.17) 
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PART I1 - UPPER STAGE VERICLES 
11-3.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This  s e c t i o n  con ta ins  s a f e t y  requirements and gu ide l ines  developed 
from analyses  of s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  i s s u e s .  The requirements and gu ide l i ne s  
a r e  grouped i n t o  f i v e  sub-sect ions ,  corresponding t o  the  f i v e  s t e p s  of  
t h e  hazard reduc t ion  precedence sequence. These f i v e  sub-sect ions a r e :  
11-3.1 Design Requirements and Guidel ines  
11-3.2 Sa f e ty  Devices 
11-3.3 Warning Devices 
11-3.4 Opera t iona l  Procedures 
11-3.5 Residual  Hazards 
11-3.1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
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Hazardous Payloads 
Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  preasures s h a l l  be l imi ted  while i n  o r  
near the o r b i t e r  such t h a t  the  f a c t o r s  of  s a f e t y  a r e  a t  least 
equal  t o  t he  o r b i t e r  tank f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y .  (GP-1.A, 1.1.001). 
Gaseous content  of upper s t age  veh ic le  tanks s h a l l  be small 
enough s o  t h a t  rap id  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay w i l l  not  r e s u l t  i n  overpressure.  (GR-l.B, 1.1.001) 
Tanks s h a l l  be designed s o  t h a t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure 
w i l l  not produce shrapnel .  (GR-1.C, 1.1.001) (11-5.1). 
Housings of explosive  charges s h a l l  be designed t o  prevent 
damage t o  equipment required f o r  o r b i t e r  abor t  i n  the  event 
of inadver ten t  detonat ion.  (RP-1.1.003) 
Destruct  charges s h a l l  not be incorporated i n  upper s t age  
veh ic les  when launched i n  the  o r b i  ter. (RP-1.1 .OO3) 
Prope l lan t  shut-off valves upstream from a l l  s t a r t  valves 
s h a l l  be provided s o  t h a t  inadver ten t  main valve opening 
would not s t a r t  engines on upper s t a g e  veh ic les  while i n  o r  
near  the  o r b i t e r .  (RP-1.1 .OO7) 
The design of the  upper s t age  veh ic le  con t ro l  system s h a l l  
only allow supply of e l e c t r i c a l  energy t o  t he  start valves  
of t h e  rocket  engines following p o s i t i v e  ac t ion  by the  
o r b i t e r  crew during upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  count-down i n  
o r b i t .  (RP-1.1.007) 
The f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  f o r  the upper s t a g e  veh ic le  and o r b i t e r  
attachment point  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  equal  t o  the  normal o r b i t e r  
s t r u c t u r e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y .  (GP-1.1.008) 
The upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be supported i n  the  o r b i t e r  s o  
t h a t  f a i l u r e  of  any one s t r u c t u r a l  support  member w i l l  no t  
jeopardize support  of the  upper s t age  veh ic le  during r e t u r n  
t o  e a r  th. (RP-1.1.008) 
The design of the upper s t age  veh ic le  con t ro l  system s h a l l  
only allow supply of e l e c t r i c a l  energy t o  the  separa t ion  
mechanism following p c s i t i v e  ac t ion  by the  o r b i t e r  crew 
during upper s t a g e  veh ic le  count-down i n  o r b i t .  (RP-1.1.008) 
A t t i t ude  c o n t r o l  couples i n  a l l  s i x  r o t a t i o n a l  modes s h a l l  
t e  provided on upper s t a g e  vehicles .  (GP-1.1.009) (11-5 .2) 
A 1 1  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  engines and e l e c t r o n i c s  s h a l l  be redundant 
on upper s t a g e  veh ic les ,  (RP-1.1 .OO9) 
Space Division 
Narth Amermn f3ockwell 
A l l  ven t ing  of the  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  whi le  neay t h e  o r b i t e r  
s h a l l  be  non-propulsive o r  s h a l l  t r a n s l a t e  the  vehicle away 
from t h e  o r b i t e r .  (RP-1.1.009). 
No to rques  s h a l l  be imparted t o  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  by 
t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  mechanism. (GP-1. I .OO9) 
Redundancy s h a l l  be  provided i n  t h e  means f o r  s e p a r a t i n g  the  
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e .  No s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  s h a l l  r e s u l t  I n  unpro- 
grammed motion of t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e .  (RP-1.1.010) 
O r b i t e r  t o  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  connect ions s h a l l  be  designed f o r  
emergency manual r e l e a s e  by o r b i t e r  crew member i n  e x t r a v e h i c u l a r  
a c t i v i t y .  (RR-1.1.010) (11-5 3) 
For upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  wi th  p ropu l s ion  systems us ing  common 
bulkheads,  t h e  des ign  of  t h e  propuls ion  system s h a l l  only  a l l cw 
p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  of-  both  tanks  t o  occur  s imul taneous ly ,  s o  a s  n o t  
t o  exceed t h e  a l lowable  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r e s s u r e .  (RP-1.1.011) (11-5 * 4 )  
A backup means s h a l l  b e  provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent  
o r  p r e s s u r i z e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  wi th  a p r e s s u r e  s t a b i l i z e d  
s t r u c t u r e .  (RP-1.1.012) 
The suppor t  s t r u c t u r e  of a  p r e s s u r e  s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  s h a l l  a l low s h u t t l e  de -o rb i t ,  re -ent ry  
and l and ing  fo l lowing l o s s  of p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  whi le  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay i n  o r b i t .  (GR-1 .1-012) (11-5 -5) 
A backup means of dumping p rope l l a r l t s  and p r e s s u r a n t s  from a 
r ~ t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e .  (RP-1.1.013) 
The c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided on upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  f o r  
remote- emergency j e t t i s o n i n g  of deployable  eqriipment t~ al low 
r e t r i e v a l  and stowage i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. (GP-1.1.015) 
11-3.2 SAmTY DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloads 
Soace Division 
F !o+-~ Amencan Rockwell 
11-3.2.1 Rel ief  capab i l i t y  s h a l l  t e  provlded f o r  the upper s - age  J F  .I' :le 
tanks which a u t o m a t i c d l y  l i m i t .  maximum pressure .  Venting 
s h a l l  be t o  m a c e  or  t o  a tack a t  lowtr p r ~ J s Q r e ,  and aha' : 
be arranged s o  t h a t  mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d e  c a m c t  mix ?r :A 
r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  exp2.0sio~.  (RR-1.b i.1.001) 
11-3.2.2 Capabi l i tp  s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o r b i t e L  crew t o  vent  and 
,iump upper s t age  veh ic le  preasur izcd o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  
apace wi th in  the  time cons t r a in t -  imymed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  
This capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e  wi th  t he  cargo bay doors 
open o r  closed.  (RP-1.G, 1.1.001) (LT-5.6) 
11-3.2.3 Inre r locks  , I cdundmcy , g r ~ u n d i n g  and i s o l a t i o n  d e - i c e s  s h a l l  
be provided on explosive  charges sc t h a t  no s i n g l e  de t ec t ab l e  
f a i l u r e  o r  combinaticn of uude t e c t a b i e  f a i l u r e s  s h a l l  r e s u l t  
i n  premature detonation.  (RP-1.1.003) 
11-3.2.4 A r e s t r a i n t  system s h a l l  b e  provided for the  cppel s t a g e  
veh ic les  i n  t he  o r b i t e r  cargo bay which p r e w n t s  contact  of 
the  veh ic le  with o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  o- equi?ment i n  the evenc 
of p a r t i a l  o r  t o t a l  r e l e l s e  of the  at~ackmen: points. (RP-1.1.008). 
11-3.L.5 Capabi l i ty  s k a l l  be pro\;ided For <he o r b i t 5 r  crew t c  s e l e c t i v e l y  
p re s su r i ze  o r  vent  each tank ~f an L?per stage veh ic l e  using a 
common bulkhead. This capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be avrll l a b l e  wi th  the  
o r b i t e r  cargo bay d ~ o r s  open or. closed.  <W-l.l.Oi1) (11-5.*> 
11-3.3 WARNING DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloads 
@A!!!' Space Division Nortr i Amei-can 8o%u :il 
11-3.3.1 Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  
by measurement of f l u i d  p r e s su re s ,  temperatures ,  tank s t r a i n s ,  
o r  o t h e r  means. (RF-1.F, 1.1.001) 
II-3.3.2 Upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  monopropellant temperatures and p r e s su re s  
s h a l l  be monitored, (RR-1.1.004) (11-5. 7) 
11-3.3.3 For upper stage veh i c l e s  w i th  propuls ion tanks  using common 
bulkheads,  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p ressure  between the  two tanks, 
common bulkhead s t r a i n ,  o r  o t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n s  of p o t e n t i a l  
f a i l u r e ,  shall be monitored by the o r b i t e r  crew. (RP-1.1.011) 
Space Division 
North Amercan Rockwell 
T 2-3.4 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
Hazardous Payloads 
11-I:,4.1 Pressur iz ing  gr 9 on up?er s t age  vch ic les  s h a l l  be turnea o f f  
u n t i l  immediately p r i o r  t o  r e l ea se  of the  veh ic le  from the 
o r b i t e r .  (RP-1.H, 1.1.001) (11-5.8) 
11-3*4e2 Liquid prope l lan ts  of r e t r i eved  upper s t age  veh ic les  s h a l l  be 
dumped t o  space before  i n i t i a t i o n  of the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  deorb i t  
maneuver. (RP-1. Q, 1.1.001) 
XI-3.4.3 Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  propell  an t  tank pressures  s h a l l  be reduced 
t o  the  minimum operat ing value before  r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  the o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. (RP-1.R. 1.1.001) 
11-3.4.4 Crew procedures f o r  monopropellant dump s h a l l  be provided i n  
case of rapid  r i s e  i n  pressure  o r  temperature. (RR-1.1.004) (11-5 7)  
11-3.4.5 Cleanliness of the monopropellant and a l l  mater ia l s  i n  normal 
contact  wi th  the  f l u i d  s h a l l  be cont ro l led  s o  t ha t  spontaneous 
deconposition i n  normal and emergency eiwironments is  not  
poss ible .  (RP-1.1.004) 
11-3.4.6 Orb i te r  crew cont ro l  of upper s t age  veh ic le  s h a l l  be provided 
u n t i l  separa t ion  from the  o r b i t e r  precludes p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
recontact .  (RP-leu, 1.1 .0OS) (11-5.9) 
11-3.4.7 The planned a t t i t u d e s  of the  upper s t age  vehicle  during r e l ea se  
and separa t ion  from the  o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be such t h a t  the a t t i t u d e  
con t ro l  engines a t  no time acce l e ra t e  the  vehicle  towards the  
o r b i t e r .  (GR-1.1.009) 
11-3.4.8 Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  a t t i t u d e  s h a l l  be cont ro l led  by command of 
the  o r b i t e r  crew immediately f o l f  owing re lease .  (RR-1.1 .OO9) 
11-3.4.9 I n t e r n a l  a t t i t u d e  cont ro l  s i g n a l  of the  upper s t age  veh ic lc  
s h a l l  be monitored f o r  accuracy by thi: o r b i t e r  crew before  
re lease .  (RP-1.1.009) 
11-3.4.10 Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be switched from command con t ro l  t o  
i n t e r n a l  a t t i t u d e  cont ro l  a f t e r  o r b i t e r  has been s u f f i c i e n t l y  
moved t h a t  no a t t i t u d e  change could r e s u l t  i n  c o l l i s i o n .  
(RP-1.1 . 009) 
11-3.4.11 Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be switched from connnand con t ro l  by 
the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  i n t e r n a l  t r a n s l a t i o n  cont ro l  when s u f f i c i e n t  
tioa is ava i l ab l e  f o r  the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  execute evasive 
maneuvers following any main propulsion o r  guidance fa i l -u re .  
(RR-1.1.009) 
Space Division 
North Arnw~can Hochw~ll 
The t r a j e c t o r i e s  of t h e  o r b i t e r  and t h e  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
s h a l l  b e  c o n t i n u a l l y  compared fo l l owing  r e l e a s e ,  and a means 
f o r  s h u t t i n g  down t h e  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  be provided  
i f  a c o l l i s i o n  a p p e a r s  imminent. (RR-1.1.009) 
Dumping of p r o p e l l a n t s  and p r e s s u r a n t s  from a r e t r i e v e d  upper  
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  b e  accomplished be- fore  i n i t i a t Z o n  of the 
s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  i i eo rb i t  maneuver. (RP-1.1.013) 
Dumping of p r o p e l l a n t s  and p r e s s u x a n t s  from a r e t r i e v e d  uppe r  
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew. (W-1.1.013) 
A n  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i n  whi ch p r o p e l l a n t  and p r e s s u r a n  ts have 
n o t  been  d u m p d  s h a l l  no t  be  r e t u r n e d  i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  ca rgo  
bay.  (RR-1.1.013) 
P rocedure s  s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e x t r a - v e h i c u l a r  i n s p e c t i o n  
and r e l e a s e  o r  re -a t tachment  of p a r t i a l l y  r e l e a s e d  o r  dep re s s -  
u r i z e d  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  i n  o r b i t .  (RR-1.X, 1 .1 .010)  (TI-5.3) 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
11-3.5 RESIDUAL HAZARDS 
11-3.5.1 Explosion/rupture of a  p ressur ized  
can t s i ne r  i n  3r, upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  
i n s i d e  o r  near s h u t t l e  (1.1.001) 
11-3.5.2 Combination of mutual l y  r e a c t i v e  
upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  f l u i d s  i n  
explosion o r  f i r e  i n s i d e  o r  nea r  
s h u t t l e .  (1.1.002) 
11-3.5.3 Rapid decomposi t im of nonopropell- 
a n t s  loca ted  i n  o r  l eak ing  from the  
upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  whi le  i n s i d e  o r  
near  s h u t t l e .  (1.1.004) 
11-3.5.4 Leakage of cor ros ive  f l u i d s  from 
upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  tanks whi le  
i n s i d e  t he  o r b i t e r .  (1.1.006) 
11-3.5.5 Inadver ten t  s t a r t  of an upper s t a g e  
veh i c l e  rocket  engine whi le  i n s i d e  
s h u t t l e  cargo bay. (1.1.007) 
11-3.5.6 Inadver ten t  s e p r a t i o n  of any p a r t  
of upper s t a g e  veh i c l e  whi le  
a t t ached  t o  t h e  s h u t t l e .  (1.1.008) 
11-3.5.7 Loss of a t t i t u d e l t r a n s f a t i o n  c o n t r o i  
of upper s t a g e  v s h i c l e  upon r e l e a s e  
from s h u t t l e .  (1.1.003) 
11-3.5.8 Rupture of common bulkhead tanks i n  
upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s  while  i n  o r  
near  sbu t  tle. (1.1.011) 
11-3.5.9 Loss of  ? r e s s u r i z a t i o n  i n  p ressure  
s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  veh ic le .  
(1.1.012> 
11-3.5.10 I n a b i l i t y  t o  c l o se  cargo bay doors 
af t ; r  r e t r i e v a l  of upper ;:age 
veh ic le  because of i n t e r f e r e n c e  
wi th  upper st age veh ic le .  (1.1.015) 
@A! Space Division North Arner~can Rocltwell 
11-4.0 INTERFACE SAFETY' REQUTRGiENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This s sc t jon  contains interface  sa fe ty  requirements and guidelines 
required by upper stage vehic les  t o  be  applied on interfacing veh ic l e s .  
These interface  requirements and guidelines were developed from analyses 
o f  s p e c i f i c  safety  i s s u e s ,  and are grouped i n  t h i s  sec t ion  by interfacing 
veh ic l e ,  as  follows : 
11-4.1 Earth Orbital Shuttle 
11-4.1 EARTH ORBITAL SHUTTLE 
Hazardous Payloads 
Space Division 
North Amer~can Rock\veII 
Vented gases  from the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  n o t  be  allowed 
t o  flow p a s t  t h e  s h u t t l e  p r o p e l l a n t  tanks .  (RR-1.0, 1.1.001) 
O r b i t e r  o r i e n t a t i o n  s h a l l  p o i n t  t h e  l o n g i t u d i n a l  a x i s  toward 
t h e  s e p a r a t e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  u n t i l  a  s a f e  s e p a r a t i o n  
d i s t a n c e  has  been achieved.  (RR-1.1 .OO5) (11-5 .9) 
The upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l i  be extended and r e l e a s e d  o u t s i d e  
of t h e  cargo bay such t h a t  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  r o t a t i o n  about 
any one at tachment  p o i n t  o r  about  its c e n t e r  of g r a v i t y  i n  
any d'rection upon r e l e a s e ,  w i l l  no t  impact any p a r t  of the  
o r b i t e r .  (RR-1.W. 1.1.009) (11-5.10) 
C a p a b i l i t v  s h a l l  be  prolrided f o r  v i s u a l  i n s p e c t i o n  of  an 
o r b i t e r  payload be fo re  i n i t i a t i n g  r e t r i e v a l  and loading i n t o  
t h e  o r b i t e r  cergo bay. (RP-1.1.015) 
P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  s h a l l  be  provided t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew i h  :t 
a r e t r i e v e d  payload has  been p roper ly  secured  i n  t h e  cargo bay 
b e f o r e  c l o s i n g  the cargo  bay doors.  (RP-1.1.015) 
Procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l n b l e  f o r  e x t r a v e h i c u l a r  o r  remote 
i n s p e c t i o n ,  e x t e n s i o n ,  and r e l e a s e  o r  r e -pos i t ion ing  of 
improperly stowed upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  i n  o r b i t  . (RR-1.1.015) 
S p e c i a l  o r b i t e r  a t t i t u d e  and t r a n s l a t i o n  motions s h a l l  b e  
planned t o  a s s i s t  r e l e a s e  of any s i n g l e  r e s i d u a l  connect ion 
w i t h  t h e  upper s t  age v e h i c l e .  1.010) (11-5.3) 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
11-5.0 RATIONALE FOR REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
'f 
' >  2. 
"I. ' 
Thi s  s e c t i o n  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  some of  t h e  r equ i r emen t s  and 
g u i d e l i n e s .  Th i s  d i s c u s s i o n  is  conf ined  t o  c a s e s  i n  which t h e  r a t i o n a l e  may 
not b e  obvious ,  o r  where some c l a r i f y i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n s  a r e  i n  o r d e r .  The 
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  f o l l o w s  t h e  o r d e r  of  t h e  r equ i r emen t s  and g u i d e l i n e s ,  
and r e f e r e n c e  is  made i n  p a r e n t h e s e s ,  where a p p r o p r i a t e ,  t o  s p e c i f i c  r e q u i r e -  
ments and guide1 i n e s  . 
The s ;  a t e o f  - t h e - a r t  is approaching  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  d e s i g n  
p r e s s u r e  t a n k s  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  mode when o v e r p r e s s u r i z e d  
does  n o t  produce s h r a p n e l .  T h i s  can be done, f o r  example, by 
u s i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  l a r g e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y ,  o r  by us ing  f i b e r -  
g l a s s  wound t anks .  Sh rapne l  is p o t e n t i a l l y  c a t a s t r o p h i c  t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r ,  and u s e  of s h r a p n e l - f r e e  t a n k s  would t h e r e f o r e  b e  
h i g h l y  d e s i r a b l e .  Because t h e r e  is s t i l l  doubt  about  t h e  
p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of  a c h i e v i n g  t h i s ,  i t  i s  c a l l e d  o u t  a s  a  g u i d e l i n e  
r a t h e r  t han  a r equ i r emen t .  (11-3.1.3) 
S i n c e  t h e  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  sys tem must b e  
a c t i v a t e d  immediately  upon release from t h e  o r b i t e r ,  i t  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  j e t s  do n o t  app ly  t r a n s -  
l a t i o n a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  on ly  p u r e  coup le s .  (11-3.1.11) 
Hangup of an upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  upon r e l e a s e  may r e q u i r e  on ly  a 
s m a l l  f o r c e  o r  moment t o  f r e e  t h e  v e h i c l e .  These f o r c e s  and 
moments can b e  a p p l i e d  by programming a p p r o p r i a t e  o r b t t e r  a c c e l e r a -  
t i o n s ,  and t h e  p o t e n t i a l  maneuvers shou ld  b e  d e f i n e d  i n  advance.  
These maneuvers shou ld  s t a y  w i t h i n  s t r u c t u r a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and 
shou ld  a l l o w  c l e a r a n c e  of t h e  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  from t h e  
o r b i t e r  i n  t h e  even t  of r e l e a s e  o r  no release. EVA a c t i o n  is  
a backup o p e r a t i o n  t o  t h i s .  (11-3.1.16, 11-3.4.16, 11-4.1.7) 
While v a r i o u s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  recommended t o  p r e s s u r i z e  and 
v e n t  t a n k s  f o r  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  w i t h  common bu lkhesds ,  
t h e  p r e s s u r e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between t h e  two t a n k s  must b e  main- 
t a i n e d  w i t h i n  t h e  d e s i g n  l i m i t s  a t  a l l  times. An au toma t i c  
c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  v e n t i c g  t h e  t a n k s  s o  as t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  a l l o w a b l e  
p r e s s u r e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  h a s  been cons ide red .  Such a  d e v i c e  would 
b e  r e l a t i v e l y  complex, however, and would i n t r o d u c e  ve ry  hazardous  
a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e  modes. Th i s  c a p a b i l i t y  is t h e r e f  o r e  recom- 
mended t o  be  under  crew c o n t r o l .  (11-3.1.17, 11-3.2.5) 
Even i f  a  p r e s s u r e  s t a b i l i z e d  upper  s t a g e  v e h i c l e  l o s e s  i t s  
p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  and c o l l a p s e s ,  i t  is s t i l l  d e s i r a b l e  t o  r e t u r n  
t h e  v e h i c l e  t o  e a r t h  f o r  r e p a i r .  The s u p p o r t  s t r u c t n r e  i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  bay must t h e r e f o r e  b e  des igned  f o r  t h i s  cont ingency .  
(11-3.1.19) 
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11-5.6 I f  an a b o r t  d e c i s i o n  has been made, s a f e t y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on 
landing r e q u i r e  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  dump upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
p r o p e l l a n t s  be fo re  l and ing ,  and hence b e f d r e  d e o r b i t ,  t o  pre- 
c lude  dvmping p r c p e l l a n t s  dur ing  r e e n t r y .  I f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  a l s o  l o s t  (perhaps a s  a  r e s u l t  of t h e  a b o r t  
c a u s e ) ,  then t h e  o r b i t e r  must b e  capable  of d e o r b i t i n g ,  re- 
e n t e r i n g  and l and ing  wi th  a  f u l l y  loaded up payload. s u c h  
a  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  c u r r e n t l y  provided i n  t h e  NR o r b i t e r  des ign  
a t  a  s l i g h t l y  reduced landing s i n k  speed and f a c t o r  c ~ f  s a f e t y .  
A p o t e n t i a l  s i n g l e  cause  which could both r e q u i r e  a b o r t  and 
prevent  dumping of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  p r o p e l l a n t s  is  a 
mechanical f a i l u r e  of t h e  upper s t a g e  veh ic le - to -o rb i t e r  
dump p r o v i s i o n s ,  I n  some des igns  t h i s  goes through t h e  cargo 
bay doors ,  and i t s  f a i l u r e  could prevent  t h e  doors  opening 
( t h u s  l ead ing  t o  a b o r t )  and prevent  p r o p e l l a n t  dumping. 
(11-3.2.2) 
II.-5.7 Chemical decomposition of u n s t a b l e  chemicals can be  d e t e c t e d  
by a  rise i n  temperature and p r e s s u r e .  I f  t h i s  is d e t e c t e d ,  
t h e  f l u i d s  can b e  dumped overboard be fo re  c a t a s t r o p h i c  damage 
occurs .  (11-3.3.2, 11-3.4.4) 
11-5.8 Pressur ized  p r o p e l l a n t s  have a  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  tank rup tu re .  
P r e s s u r i z a t i o n  should t h e r e f o r e  be  planned f o r  t h e  l a t e s t  t i m e  
poss ib le .  A t r a d e o f f  e x i s t s  h e r e  between exposing t h e  o r b i t e r  
t o  t h i s  hazard  f o r  a  s h o r t  t i m e  by p r e s s u r i z i n g  b e f o r e  r e l e a s i n g  
t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e ,  and e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e  hazard t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  
e n t i r e l y  by p r e s s u r i z i n g  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s  when t h e  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  is some d i s t a n c e  away from t h e  o r b i t e r .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  
c a s e  t h e  r i s k  is being taken t h a t  a  malfunct ion  may occur which 
p reven t s  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  which may have been c o r r e c t i b l e  b e f o r e  
release, thus  l o s i n g  t h e  mission.  Cn ba lance ,  t h e  former r i s k  
w a s  judged t o  be p r e f e r a b l e .  (11-3.4.1) 
11-5.9 Various measures can b e  taken t o  prevent  damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  
i n  t h e  event  of an upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  engir.e 
malfunct ion.  The b e s t  c o n t r o l  of t h e  hazard ,  li(>wever, is t o  
provide  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  s h u t  down t h e  mal- 
func t ion ing  engines.  Minimizing t h e  exposed a r e a  of t h e  o r b i t e r  
is a l s o  cons idered  a  requirement.  (11-3.4.6, 11-4.1.2) 
11-5*10 Following a  deployment mechanism malfunct ion ,  t h e  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e  may be  f r e e  t o  r o t a t e  about  t h e  remaining a t t a c h  p o i n t s ,  
o r ,  i f  completely unat tached,  may be  r o t a t i n g  about  its c e n t e r  
of g r a v i t y .  Under such c i rcumstances  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  
must not  c o n t a c t  t h e  o r b i t e r .  (11-4.1.3) 
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PART I11 - SPACE STATION 
111- 3. O SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
This s e c t i o n  con ta ins  s a f e t y  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s  developed 
from analyses  of s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  i s s u e s .  The requirements and g u i d e l i n e s  
a r e  grouped i n t o  f i v e  sub-sec t ions ,  corresponding t o  the  f i v e  s t e p s  of t h e  
hazard  reduc t ion  precedence sequence. These f i v e  s u b s e c t i o n s  a r e :  
111-3.1 Design Requirements and Guidel ines  
111-3.2 S a f e t y  Devices 
111-3.3 Warning Devices 
111-3.4 Opera t iona l  Procedures 
111-3.5 Res idual  Hazards 
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111-3.1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
Hazardous Payloads 
Toxic flannnable o r  co r ro s ive  f l u i d  con ta ine rs  s h a i l  be loca ted  
i n  unpressur ized volumes of p r e s su r i z ed  payloads,  o r  s h a l l  be  
double contained wi th  the  c a p a b i l i t y  of dumping t he  f l u i d  t o  
space  o r  of f - loading t o  another  double con t a ine r ,  and of ven t i n  f the  space  between t h e  two con t a ine r s  t o  space.  (RP-1.Y , 1.2.00 ) (111-5 1 )  
Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  purge o r  dmp t o  space a t o x i c a l l y  
contaminated o r  co r ro s ive  atmosphere i n  a  p ressur ized  o r b i t e r  
payload. (RR-1. d ,  1.2.001) 
Capab i l i t y  t o  r e l e a s e ,  e j e c t ,  o r  ex t e rd  the  payload s h a l l  b e  
provided s o  a s  t o  prevent  d a m  e  t o  the  o r b i ~ e r  a t  the  expense t of t h e  payload. (RR-1.h , 1 - 7 .  02) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided f o r  the o r b i t e r  crew t o  ven? and 
dump p re s su r i z ed ,  flammable o r  hazer2cw- , #  ..?load f l u i d s  t o  space 
w i th in  ti le t i m e  c c n s t r a i n t s  imposed by *A abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  
c a p n b i l i t ~  s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  wi th  the cargo bay doors open o r  
c losed.  (RR-1.i, 1.2.002) 
Capab i r i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  swi tch  o f f  a l l  e l e c t r i c a l  loads  
t o  payload from the  o r b i t e r .  (RP-1. j, 1.2.002) 
F i r e  and hea t  r e s i s t a n t  p r o t e c t i o n  of o r b i t e r  t o  payload cowand 
and ins t rumenta t ion  i n t e r f a c e s  s h a l l  be prmided. (33-l.n,  1.2.002) (111-5.2) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided t o  au tomat ica l iy  shu t  off forced 
a i r  c i r c c l a t i o n  i n  a  p ressur ized  o r b i t e r  payload upon d e t e c t i o n  
of a f i r e .  (RR-1.2.003) (111-5.3) 
Ma te r i a l s  used i n  p r e s su r i z ed  payloads s h a l l  be s u b j e c t  t o  t he  
same flammabilty con t ro l  procedures a s  those used wi th in  t h e  
o r b i t e r  p r e s su r i z ed  volumcs. (RR-1.2.003) 
A:cess f o r  v i s c s l  i n spec t i on  by i n t r a v e h i c u l a r  activi  t y  o r  
remotely by ins t rumenta t ion  s h a l l  be provided t o  all .  ?ximars 
s t r u c t u r e  of p r e s su r i z ed  payloads whi le  i n  the  o r 5 i t e r  cargo 
bay. (GR-1.2.004) 
The f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  of p r e s su re  v c s s e l s  whi le  i n  o r  nea r  the 
o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be  a t  l e a s t  equa l  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  tank f a c t o r s  
of s a f e t y .  (GP-1.2 005) 
Gas?ous cop ten t  of p r e s su r i z ed  tanks s h a l l  be smal l  enough so t h a t  
r ap id  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay w i l l  no;: 
r e s u l t  i n  overpressure .  (RR-1.2.005) 
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Tanks s h a l l  be designed 30 t h a t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure  w i l l  
no t  produce sh rapne l .  (GR-1.C 1.1 e001) (111-5.4) 
P r e s s u r i z e d  tanks  s h a l l  be  l o c a t e d  o r  p r o t e c t e d  by sh rapne l  proof 
b a r r i e r s  s o  t h a t  explos ion  of one w i l l  no t  propagate t o  o t h e r s .  
(RR-1.2.005) 
P r e s s u r i z e d  t m k s  s h a l l  b e  l o c a t e d  o r  provided wi th  s h r a p n e l  proof 
b a r r i e r s  s o  t h a t  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger  compartments and 
equipment r e q u i r e d  f o r  o r b i t e r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  w i l l  be  p r o t e c t e d  
i n  t h e  event  of a  tank explos ion .  (RR-1.2.005) 
Plumbing connect ions  f o r  t . x z r d o u s  f  h i d  t r a n s f e r  i n  p r e s s u r i z e d  
a r e a s  s h a l l  be  double conta ined w i t h  the  c a p a b i l i t y  of ven t ing  
t h e  space  between t h e  two c o n t a i n e r s  t o  space .  (RR-1.3.002) 
Cargo beyond t h e  limits ailowed f o r  hand t r a n s f e r  s h a l l  be 
t r a n s f e r r e d  on guide r a i l s  o r  o t h e r  mechanisms which p o s i t i v e l y  
c o n s t r a i n  the  a n g u l a r  and l i n e a r  motion of t h e  cargo except  i n  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of motion. (RP-1.3.002) (111-5.5) 
Cargo handl ing  mechanisms s h a l l  a l low f o r  s toppage of  t h e  motion, 
r e v e r s a l  of  the  motion, o r  r e l e a s e  of t h e  cargo a t  any p o i n t  
a long t h e  t r a n s f e r  pa th .  (RP-l.dd , 1.3.062) 
Cargo hand l ing  mechanisms s h a l l  b e  des igned t o  wi ths tand  the 
propu l s ive  f o r c e s  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from a  l eak ing  o r  ruptured  
f l u i d  cargo.  (RR-l.hh , 1.3.002) 
Separa te  l i n e s  s h a l l  b e  used f o r  the  t r a n s f e r  of f t e l  and 
c x i d i z e r .  (RR-1.3.003) 
Cargo s h a l l  b e  packaged dur ing  t r a n s f e r  s o  a s  t o  have no 
exposed s h a r p  edges o r  co rners .  (RR-1.3.004) 
C r e w  c o n t r o l l e d  cargo t r a n s f e r  v e l o c i t y  s h a l l  b e  l i m i t e d  s o  t h a t  
t h e  cargo can a t  a l l  t imes b e  s topped r i t h i n  t h e  v i s i b l e  
range. (RP-1.3.004) 
Cargo beyond the  l i m i t s  allowed fo r  hand t r a n s f e r  s h a l l  be  
t r a n s f e r r e d  on guide r a i l s  o r  o t h e r  mechanisms which p o s i t i v e l y  
of t h e  cargo except  i n  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  angu la r  and l i n e a r  motion 
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  motion. (RP-1.3.004) 
evacuate  pe r sonne l  from 
modules u n t i l  t hey  can 
C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided t o  r a p i d l y  
and s e a l  o f f  r a d i o a c t i v e l y  contaminated 
be r e t u r n e d  t o  e a r t h .  (RR-1.3.005) 
Neans s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  decontaminat ing equipment and personnel  
exposed t o  r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l  and f o r  s t o r i n g  and r e t u r n i n g  t o  
e a r t h  r a d i o a c t i v e l y  contaminated c l o t h i n g  and o t h e r  m a t e r i a l .  
(RR-1.3 . 005) 
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The r e f l ec t ance  o r  su r f aces  on docking veh ic les  and the  docking 
system t h a t  a r e  v i s i b l e  t o  t he  con t ro l l i ng  crew and T.V. cameras 
s h a l l  be below eye and vidicon damage l e v e l s .  (KP-2.1.001) 
The vidicon tubes f o r  docking shall be designed f o r  low e e n s i t i v i t y  
t o  tube image burn. (GP-2.1.001) 
Redundant o r  replaceable  l i g h t i n g  provis ions  s h a l l  be provided f o r  
docking. (RP-2.1.00 1 )  
Redundant o r  replaceable  vidicon tubes s h a l l  be provided f o r  docking. 
(RR-2 . 1.001) 
Redundant o r  replaceable  video monitors s h a l l  be provided. 
(RR-2.1.00 1)  
The r eac t ion  jet cont ro l  system s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  preclude 
"jet s tuck  on" and jet s tuck  off"  condi t ions .  (RP-2.A, 2.1.002) 
Docking system rapid  emergency r e l e a s e  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided. 
(RR-2.1.003) 
The docking system s h a l l  be designed t o  withstand normal jackknifing 
veh ic le  dynamics and w i l l  l i m i t  a t t i t u d e  excursions t o  wi th in  pre- 
sc r ibed  l i m i t s  a s  determined by veh ic l e  geometry t o  prevent inad- 
v e r t e n t  veh ic l e  contact .  (RR-2.1.003) 
The docking system s h a l l  be capable of withstanding veh ic le  o s c i l l a -  
t i on  and 'oads generated by inadver ten t  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  system 
a c t i v i t y  of e i t h e r  o r  both  veh ic les  during draw down t o  r i g i d i z e  
the  capture  i n t e r f  ace. (RR-2.1 .OO4) 
Thermal p ro tec t ion  s h a l l  be provided t o  prevent jet  plume impinge- 
ment damage from docking veh ic les  wi th in  t h e  design angular  and 
l i n e a r  misalignments. (RR-2.1.004) 
Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  r ecyc l e  both  capture  and seal 
l a t ches  on the  docking system from any phase of t h e i r  s t a t u s .  
(RR-2.1.005) 
Docking por t  environmental covers s h a l l  be deployed and no t  
j e t t i soned .  (RP-2.1,005) 
Al l  hardware i n  the  docking tunnel  w i l l  be f l u s h  mounted t o  i n t e r i o r  
walls of the  cargofcrew t r a n a f e r  tunnel.  (RP-2 ,l.OO7) 
Stops s h a l l  be provided on hatches t o  prevent uncontrolled opening 
i f  opened when a pressure  d i f  f e r e r r t i a l  exists, (RP-2,l .OW) 
111-3.1.39 A l l  docking i n t e r f a c e  equipment s h a l l  be grounded. (RR-2.1.011) 
111-3.1.40 E l e c t r i c a l  umbi l i ca l s  s h a l l  be  grounded u n t i l  connection of  t h e  
docking i n t e r f a c e .  (RR-2.1.011) 
111-3.1.42 Thermal b lanket  temperature c o n t r o l  of  hydrau l i c  components s h a l l  
provide proper opera t ing  temperature. (RP-2.2.002) 
On-board S u r v i v a b i l i t y  
111-3.1.42 Normally h a b i t a b l e  compartments of more than 25 m3 (880 i t 3 )  i n  
volume s h a l l  hhve two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  a r ea s  which provide f o r  
personnel  s u r v i v a l .  These e x i t s  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  3 n (10 f t )  
a p a r t .  ( R R - L C ,  3.1.001) 
111-3.1.43 Flammable, exp los ive  o r  gas genera t ing  ma te r i a l  s h a l l  be l oca t ed  
s o  t h a t  the  energy content  which can be  propagated a t  any one 
l o c a t i o n  s h a l l  not  r e s u l t  i n  ove rp r e s su r i z a t i on  of t he  compartment 
from hea t  and gas production.  (RR-3.D, 3.1.001! 
111-3.1.44 Flammable, explos ive  o r  gas genera t ing  ma te r i a l  w i th in  3 m (10 f t )  
of t he  en t rance  t o  compartments wi th  only one e n t r y l e g r e s s  path  
s h a l l  be l i m i t e d  so t h a t  thq- energy con t en t ,  i f  r e l z a sed ,  w i l l  
no t  r e s u l t  i n  damage o r  an environment which prevents  s h i r t s l e e v e  
access  through t h e  ent rance .  (RR-3.E, 3.1.001) 
Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided f o r  t h e  emergency s h i r t s l e e v e  s u r v i v a l  
of a l l  on-board personnel  u n t i l  the  nex t  resupply  o r  emergency 
s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  fa l lowing the  l o s s  of access  t o  any one module1 
compartment and the  l o s s  of cqz ipscn t  and s u p p l i e s  i n  t h a t  module1 
compartment. A s h i r t s l e e v e  a c c e s s i 3 l e  Cocking p o r t  s h a l l  be a v a i l -  
ab l e .  I f  t he  l o s s  o f  t he  module/comparrment d iv ide s  t h e  s t a t i o n  
i n t o  two o r  more i s o l a t e d  hhb i t ab l e  s e c t i o n ,  then each s e c t i o n  
s h a l l  provide t he  s u r v i v a l  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel ,  
i nc lud ing  an a v a i l a b l e  docking p o r t .  (RR-3. F , 3 . lS002)  
111-3.1.46 A backcp EVA eg re s s / i ng re s s  hatch  which can be used f o r  contingency 
EVA s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e .  Capab i l i t y  f o r  dep re s su r i z a t i on  and repress -  
u r i z a t i o n  of t he  connecting compartment/module s h a l l  be  provided 
(RR-3*J, 3.1.008) 
I1 1-3.1.47 Two o r  more en t rances  i n t o  normally h a b i t a b l e  compartments 
of  mre than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  i n  volume s h a l l  be s h i r t s l e e v e  
acce s s ib l e  from each of t he  o t h e r  normally i nhab i t ed  compart- 
ments. These en t r ances  s h a l l  b e  a t  l e a s t  3 m (10 f t )  apar t .  
(RR-3.1.002) 
Space Divis~on 
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111-3,1.48 Where only one s h i r t s l e e v e  i ng re s s / eg r e s s  path  is provided i n t o  a 
compartment o r  module, redundant means s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
opening t he  connecting ha tch(es )  from e i t h e r  s i d e .  (RR-3.1 .OOS) 
111-3.1.49 Manned s o r t i e  m d u l e s  and space s t a t i o n  modules s h a l l  be  designed 
s o  t h a t  they can be undocked. r e t r i e v e d  i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  czrgo 
bay and re tu rned  t o  e a r t h  unprceeurized,  (GR-3.1.007) 
111-3.1.50 Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided t o  dep re s su r i z e  docked modules be fo r e  
undocking. (RR-3.1,007) 
111-3.1.51 An emergency I V A  o r  EVA r e t u r n  rou t e  s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  any 
planned I V A  a c t i v i t y  independent of the  normal IVA a i r l o c k  rou t e .  
Depressur iza t ion  and r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided 
f o r  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  compartment(s) o r  module(s) which must be  used. 
(RR-3.1,011) 
Space Division 
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111-3.2 SAFETY DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloads  
111-3.2.1 Tox ic  flammable o r  c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d  c o n t a i n e r s  s h a l l  be l o c a t e d  
i n  u n p r e s s u r i z e d  volumes o f  p r e s s u r i z e d  pay loads ,  o r  s h a l l  b e  
doub le  con ta ined  w i t h  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  dumping t h e  f l u i d  t o  
s p a c e  o r  o f f - l o a d i n g  t o  a n o t h e r  double  c o n t a i n e r ,  and of v e n t i n g  
t h e  s p a c e  be tveen  t h e  two c o n t a i n e r s  t o  space .  (RP-1.Y, I. .2 ,001)  
111-3,2.2 Erergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided  t o  s u s t a i n  p e r s o n n e l  when 
i n  a  manned payload ,  fo l lowing  d e t e c t i o n  o f  a  t o x i c  environment  
i n  t h e  payload ,  u n t i l  ~ s c a p e  i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  can b e  e f f e c t e d .  
(RR-Lb, 1 .2 .001)  
111- 3.2 .3  S p e c i a l  p r o t e c t i v e  garments  and equipment s h a l l  b e  provided  f o r  
p e r s o n n e l  working i n  a t o x i c  snvironmenr o r  n e a r  p o t e n t i a l l y  
t o x i c  payload e l emen t s .  (RP-l.c, 1 .2 .001)  
111-3.2.4 Manually and remote ly  c o n t r o l l e d  means s h a l l  b e  provided  i r .  
p r e s s u r i z e d  o r b i t e r  pay loads  f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  and e x t i n g t i s h i n g  
f i r e s .  (RR-1.2.003) 
111-3.2.5 Emergency l i f e  s u p p o r t  s h a l l  b e  provided  f o r  a l l  p e r s o n n e l  i n  
manned o r b i t e r  pay loads  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a l l o w  them t ime t o  c o n t r o l  
a  f i r e  and /o r  e scape  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  (RR-1.2.f 3)  
, -. 
111-3.2,6 C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  p rov ided  t o  r e l i e v e  a tmosphe r i c  p r e s s u r e  from 
an o r b i t e r  pay load  s o  a s  t o  p r e v e n t  p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  beyond t h e  
2ayload  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s .  T h i s  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  a u t o m a t i c  
when t h e  payload is  n o t  manned, and under c o n t r o l  of  t h e  occupants  
when manned. The maximum dump r a t e  s h a l l  n o t  exceed t h e  v e n t i n g  
c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo  bay w i t h  t h e  c a r g o  bay door s  
c l o s e d ,  (RR-1.2.003) 
111-3.2.7 Means s h a l l  be provided  f o r  t h e  l o c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  r a d i a n t  o r  
o t h e r  t y p e  ~f  h e a t  remote ly  o r  by p e r s o n n e l  i n  IVA o r  EVA a c t i v i t y  
t o  e v a p o r a t e  a c c u ~ u l a t i o n s  of  f r o z e n  f l u i d s  from c r i t i c a l  a r e a s .  
(RR-1.2.004) (111-5.6) 
I 11-3.2.8 R e l i e f  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided  f o r  , r e s s u r i z e d  ~ a n k s  which 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  L i m i t  maximum p r e s s u r e .  Vent ing  s h a l l  b e  t o  s p a c e  
o r  t o  a tank  a t  lower  p r e s s u r e ,  and s h a l l  b e  a r r anged  s o  t h a t  
mu tua l ly  r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot  mix and r e s u l t  i n  a  f i r e  o r  
, exp los ion .  (RP-1.2,005) 
111-3.2.9 Hazardous f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  s h a l l  b e  double  con ta ined  du r fng  
h a n d l i n g  and t r a n s f e r  i n  p r e s s u r i z e d  a r e a s .  C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  
provided  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  b o t h  c o n t a i n e r s  b e f o r e  and 
a f t e r  t r a n s f e r .  (RP-1.0, 1.3.001) (111-5.7) 
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111-3.2,10 Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  veilt the  space between double 
con ta ine rs  t o r  hazardous f l u i d  handl ing t o  space and f o r  dumping 
the  f l u i d  t o  space o r  of f - loading t o  another  con ta ine r .  (RP-lap, 1.3,001) 
111-3.2.11 Packaging of hand-carried car,o s h a l l  be provided wi th  m u l t i p l e  
hard holds ,  s h a l l  al low forward v i s i b i l i t y  by the  c o n t r o l l i n g  
personnel ,  and s h a l l  be  capable of su rv iv ing  impact a g a i a s t  a  
sharp  ob j ec t  a t  3 m/sec (10 f t / s e = ) .  (RP-l.aa, 1.3.001j (111-5.8) 
111-3.2.12  provision^ s h a l l  be made f o r  r ap id ly  secur ing  hand-carried cargo 
t o  v a ~ i o u s  s t r u c t u r a l  po in t s  a long the  t r a n s f e r  pa th  s o  a s  t o  
nrcvent  l o s s  of c o n t r o l  of t he  cargo i n  t he  event  of  an emergency. 
(RP-1-bb , 1.3.001) 
111-3,2.13 Colrosive f l u i d s  o r  ma t e r i a l s  s h a l l  be double contained dur ing 
handling and t r a n s f e r  i t ,  unpressurized a r ea s .  Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  
be provided t o  v e r i f y  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of both con ta ine rs  be fo r e  
and a f t e r  t r a n s f e r .  [RP-1.3.003) 
111-3.2.14 Cargo of more than 45 kg (100 l b )  mass, o r  nazardous cargo s h a l l  
be t e the red  a t  a l l  t imes dur ing handl ing and t r a n s f e r  i n  p ressur ized  
a reas  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  spacec r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  o r  t o  the  t r a n s f e r  mech- 
anism s o  a s  t o  limit the poss ib l e  t r a v e l  of the  cargo f o l l w i n g  
a f a i l u r e  of  the primary cargo e t t a c h  mechanism. (RR-1.3.004) (TII-5 .9) 
111-3.2.15 Automatic and/or  crew con t ro l l ed  emergency means s h a l l  be  provided 
f o r  s h u t '  ' .;. o f f  F ,wer and a r r e s t i n g  t he  motion of cargo t r a n s f e r  
mechanism3. (RR-1.3.934) 
III-3.2.16 Spare sh ie lded  con ta ine rs  s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  i n  which r ad ioac t i ve  
ma te r i a l s  cap be  temporari ly s t o r e d  i n  the  event  of an acc iden t -  
(RR-1.3 .O35) (111-5.14) 
111-3,2.17 Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  l o c a t i n g  r ad ioac - i ve  mat. i a l  which 
Las beeil i aa t ive r ten t ly  r e l e a t e d  i n  a module. (RR-1 3.005) (111-5.14) 
Docking 
111-3.2.18 Window, v id icon,  apd EVA v i s o r  f i l t e r s  a h a i l  b e  provided t o  p r o t e c t  
eyes and canera from docking l a s e r  l i g h t  damage. (RP-2.1.001) 
111-3.2.i9 I n h i b i t  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be p r w i d e d  t o  c o n ~ r o l  t he  " j e t  s t u c k  on" 
condi t ion ,  (RR-i.~ , 2.3 .002! 
111-3.2.20 E i t he r  manud and/or  redrmdant automatic a t t i t u d e  hold i n h i b i t  func- 
t i o n s  s h a l l  be provided t o  t h e  app l i c ab l e  docking veh i c l e  oc indica-  
t i o n  of capture .  (RP-2.1 .GO4! 
111-3.2.21 Control  s y s t e m  i n h i b i t  s ~ r i t c h e s  s h a l l  be pro tec ted  from inadve r t en t  
a c t i v a t i o n  o r  d e a c t i v a t i o ~ .  (RP-2,l. 094) 
111-3.2.22 Docking l a t c h i n g  systems r ecyc l e  swi tches  s h a l l  be p ro tec ted  from 
inadver ten t  a c t i v a t i o n .  [RP-2.1.005) 
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111-3.2.22 Docking l a t c h i n g  systems r e c y c l e  swi tches  s h a l l  be p r o t e c t e d  from 
i n a d v e r t e n t  a c t i v a t i o n .  RP-2 ,l. 005) 
111-3.2.23 Stowage o r  t i e  down s h a l l  be provided f o r  crew and c r i t i c a l  equipment 
dur ing  docking. (GP-2.1.008) 
111-3.2.24 Means s h a l l  be provided t o  e q u a l i z e  p r e s s u r e s  on both  s i d e s  of a 
ha tch  b e f o r e  ope.ning i t .  (RP-2.1.010) 
111-3.2.25 C i r c u i t  b reaker  p r o t e c t i o n  of a l l  i n t e r f a c e  ins t rumenta t ion  s h a l l  be 
provided. (RR-2.1.011) 
On-board Survi~rab  ili t y  
111-5.2.26 C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provided t o  reduce t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  each compart- 
ment s u f f i c i e n t l y  , o r  i n c r e a s e  i t  i n  t h e  a d j o i n i n g  compartment(s) 
and t o  c u t  o f f  a i r  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  s o  t h a t  i n  an emergency t h e  atmos- 
phere i n  the  a f f e c t c '  compartment w i l l  n o t  be propagated i n t o  
a d j o i n i n g  compartments. This  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  
remotely from each compartment. (RR-3.A, 3.1.001) 
III- 3.2.27 Automatic ven t ing  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided i n  each compartment 
s o  t h a t  i n  t h e  event  of a  f i r e  o r  r e l e a s e  of gases  w i t h i n  t h e  com- 
partment t h e  ? r e s s u r e  w i l l  n o t  exceed the  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s  of t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  o r  the  c a p a b i l i t y  of s e a l s  t o  o t h e r  compartments t o  exclude  
t h e  contaminated atmosphere. (RR-3.B, 3.1.001) 
111-3.2.28 Emergency p o r t a b l e  l i f e  suppor t  systems s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  
a i r l o c k  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u s t a i n  I V A  personnel  i n  an emergency IVA 
o r  EVA r e t u r n  from d planned I V A  a c t i v i t y .  (RR-3.1.011) 
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111-3.3 WARNING DEVICES 
Hazardous Payloads 
111-3.3.1 Means s h a l l  be  ~ r o v i d e d  f o r  d e t e c t i n g  t h e  presence of s p i l l e d  
hazardous f l u i d s  o r  materials whi le  being handled o r  t r a n s f e r r e d  
between p r e s su r i z ed  modules. (GR-1. t , 1.3.001) 
111-3.3.2 Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
mesurement  of f l u i d  p r e s su re s ,  temperatures ,  tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  
o t h e r  means, ( R P - l . ~ ,  1.1.001) 
111-3.3.3 Double contained t o x i c ,  flammable o r  cor ros ive  f l u i d  con ta ine rs  
s h a l l  be provided w i th  means t o  d e t e c t  leakage of t he  t o x i c ,  
flammable o r  co r ro s ive  f l u i d  i n t o  t h e  space between t h e  con t a ine r s ,  
and wi th  means t o  d e t e c t  pene t r a t i on  of  t he  o u t s i de  con ta ine r .  
(RP-1.2, 1.2.001) 
111-3.3.4 Meas s h a l l  be  provided f o r  d e t e c t i n g  a t o x i c ,  flammable, o r  
oxygen enr iched environment i n  p r e s su r i z ed  o r b i t e r  payloads 
con ta in ing  t ox i c ,  p o t e n t i a i l y  t o x i c ,  f  l a w a b l e ,  oxygen enr iched 
f l u i d s .  (RP-l.a , 1 .2  .C01) (111-5.10) 
Docking 
111-3.3.5 P o s i t i v e ,  redundant i n d i c a t i o n  a f  docking cap tu re  l a t c h  s h a l l  be 
provided the  v e h i c l e  which is  t o  i n h i b i t  i ts c o n t r o l  system. 
(RR-2.1.004) 
111-3.3.6 P o s i t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  of  docking cap tu re  l a t c h  s t a t u s  s h a l l  be provided 
t o  a s su r e  they a r e  each (1)  armed, (2)  t r i g g e r e d ,  (3) engsged, and 
(4 )  locked. (a-2 .1 .005)  
111-3.3.7 P o s i t i v e ,  redundant i n d i c a t i o n  o f  docking p o r t  seal l a t c h  s t a t u s  s h a l l  
be provided t o  a s su r e  they are each (1)  armed, (2)  t r i g g e r e d ,  (3) en- 
gaged, and (4)  locked p r i o r  t o  opening t r a n s f e r  tunnel .  (RR-2.1.005) 
111-3.3.8 Annunciator warning t o  a l l  personnel  s h a l l  be provided p r i o r  t o  
manned docking maneuvers. (RP-2.1.008) 
111-3.3.9 Means s h a l l  be provided t o  v e r i i y  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of a  docking hatch  
seal be fo r e  s e p a r a t i n g  a docked module o r  veh ic le .  (RP-2.1. C10) 
111-3.3.10 P o s i t i v e  redundant i n d i c a t f o n  of the. pneumatic a t t e n u a t i o n  system 
s t a t u s  of  t he  extendable  docklng system s h a l l  be provided. 
(W-2.3.003) 
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OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
Hazardous Payloads  
Hand c a r r i e d  ca rgo  s h a l l  be l i m i t e d  t o  45 kg (100 l b )  mass, p rovided  
t h e  c e n t e r  of mass is w j t h i n  35 cms (14 i n s . )  of t h e  handhold.  Cargo 
which exceeds  t h e s e  l i m i t s  s h a l l  be t r a n s p o r t e d  w i t h  mechanica l  
a s s i s t .  (RP-1.y , 1.3.001)  (111-5.9) 
C a r g ~  i n  which a  r u p t u r e  o r  l eakage  through t h e  c o n t a i n e r s  would 
r e s u l t  i n  u n c o n t r o l l e d  motion of t h e  ca rgo  because  of p r a p u l s i v e  
f o r c e s  beyond a s i n g l e  man's c a p a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  o r  because  
t o x i c i t y  r e q u i r e s  immediate abandonment and e v a c u a t i o n  of t h e  a r e a  
s h a l l  n o t  b e  hand-car r ied .  (GR-l.z, 1 .3 .001)  
The t r a n s f e r  of ca rgo  w i t h  mechanical  a s s i s t  s h a l l  e i t h e r  b e  v i s u a l l y  
monitored by p e r s o n n e l  who are f r e e  of o t h e r  d u t i e s ,  o r  s h a l l  b e  
provided  w i t h  s e n s i n g  d e v i c e s  which a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s t o p  t h e  motion 
i f  t h e  c a r g o  i n t e r f a c e s  w i t h  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment.  (RP-l.ee, 1.3.002) 
Pe r sonne l  s h a l l  no t  be l o c a t e d  d u r i n g  ca rgo  t r a n s f e r  i n  p o s i t i o n s  
which can r e s u l t  i n  t h e i r  en t rapment  i f  t h e  ca rgo  t r a n s f e r  mechan- 
i s m  f a i l s .  (RR-1.i;. 1 .3 .002)  
Emergency p rocedures  s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e l e a s i n g  ca rgo  which 
h a s  become jammed i n  h a t c h e s  o r  o t h e r  r e s t r i c t e d  a r e a s  wit!,out 
caus ing  damage tc  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment.  
(RR-1.3.004) (111-5.11) 
T r a n s f e r  l i n e s  i n  u n p r e s s u r i z e d  a r e a s  s h a l l  b e  purged a f t e r  t h e  
t r a n s f e r  of hazardous  f l u i d s .  (RP-1.3.003) 
T r a n s f e r  l i n e s  i n  p r e s s u r i z e d  a r e a s ,  i n c l u d i n g  double  w a l l e d  l i n e s ,  
s h a l l  be purged a f t e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of  hazardous  f l u i d s  and b e f o r e  
b r e a k i n g  plumbing connec t ions .  (RP-1.3.002) 
Emergency p rocedures  s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  r e l e a s e ,  h a n d l i n g  and 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of r emc te ly  c o n t r o l l e d  c a r g o  i n  t h e  e v e n t  af  f a i l u r e  
of t h e  h a n d l i n g  mechanism, o r  of damage t o  t h e  9ackaging of t h e  cargo .  
(GP-l.gg , 1.3.002) 
T r a n s f e r  l i n e s  f o r  hazardous  f l u i d s  s h a l l  be  l o c a t e d  o u t s i d e  of 
p r e s s u r i z e d  v e s s e l s  o r  s h a l l  b e  double  b a l l e d  w i t h  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
of v e n t i n g  t h e  s p a c e  between t h e  t . ~ o  c o n t a i n e r s  t o  space .  
(PR-1.3.002) 
Emergency procedures s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  h a n d l i n g ,  c c n t a i n i n g ,  
and d i s p o s i n g  of s p i l l e d  hazardous  f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  s o  as t o  
s a f e g u a r d  t h e  p e r s o n n e l ,  o r b i t e r  and payload ,  i n  t h a t  o r d e r .  
(RR-Lee, 1 . 3 . 0 0 i j  
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1-3.4.11 Procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  handling and t r a n s f e r r i n g  hazardous 
f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  i n  a  p r e s s u r i z e d  a r e a  from c s i n g l y  pene t ra ted  
double c o n t a i n e r  t o  a  s t o r a g e  c o n t a i n e r  wi thout  r e l e a s i n g  f l u i d  o r  
m a t e r i a l  t o  t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  atmosphere. (RP-1.3.001) 
111-3.4.12 Manual handl ing  and t r a n s f e r  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  s h a l l  
be c a r r i e d  o u t  by two o r  more personnel  who s h a l l  have no o t h e r  
d u t i e s  dur ing  t h i s  opera t ion .  (RP-1.vS 1.3.001) (111-5.12) 
111-3.4.13 Mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  s h a l l  no t  be handled o r  t r a n s f e r r e d  simul- 
taneously .  (RR-l.w, 1.3.001) (111-5.13) 
111-3.4.14 The p r e s s u r e s ,  tempera tures ,  o r  o t h e r  parameters  which i n d i c a t e  t h e  
s t a t u s  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  b e f o r e  
they a r e  t r anspor ted .  (RP-lox, 1.3.001) 
Dockinn 
111-3.4.15 The p r e s s u r e s  on each  s i d e  of a  h a t c h  s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  b e f o r e  
opening t h e  ha tch .  (PP-2.1.010) 
111-3.4.16 Personnel  w i l l  on ly  be t r a n s f e r r e d  between t h e  o r b i t e r  &,J ;he 
s t a t i o n  through a  r i g i d l y  connected docking i n t e r f a c e  between t h e  
two v e h i c l e s .  (RR-2.4.003) 
On-board S u r v i v a b i l i t y  
111-3.4.17 Personnel  s h a l l  no t  be  allowed i n  a  s o r t i e  o r  space  s t a t i o n  module 
dur ing  r e p o s i t i o n i n g  of t h e  module from one docking p o r t  t o  another .  
(RR-3.1.006) 
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111-3.5 RESIDUAL HAZARDS 
Exposure of the  s h u t t l e  crew o r  
passengers t o  a t o x i c  environment 
r e l e a sed  from a v e s s e l  i n  t h e  payload 
con ta in ing  a t o x i c  f l u i d .  (1.2.001) 
A f i r e  i n  the  cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from 
r e l e a s e  and i g n i t i o n  of a flammable 
f l u i d  i n  an unpressur ized payload. 
(1.2.002) 
A f i r e  i n  a p r e s su r i z ed  payload i n  t h e  
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from r e l e a s e  and 
i g n i t i o n  of a flammable f l u i d .  (1.2.003) 
A co r ro s ive  environment i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from leakage o r  
r up tu r e  of a payload v e s s e l  conta in ing 
a cor ros ive  f l u i d .  (1.2.604) 
An explosion i n  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 
of a p o t e n t i a l l y  exp los ive  payload 
ve s se l .  (1.2.005) 
S r i l l a g e  o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  dur ing manual t r a n s f e r  i n  
p ressur ized  modules. (1.3.001) 
S p i l l a g e  o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d s  
o r  ma t e r i a l s  dur i3g  mechanically 
a s s i s t e d  o r  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
p ressur ized  modules. (1.3.002) 
Sp i l l age  o r  leakage o r  hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  dur ing  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
unpressur i  zed a r e a .  (1.3.003) 
A r ad ioac t i ve  environment i n  a s o r t i e  
module o r  space  s t a t i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  
from exposure o r  escape of r ad ioac t i ve  
m a t e r i a l  dur ing t r a n s f e r  and handl ing 
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Unresolved 
S a f e t y  
I s s u e s  
~ c c e p t  ab l e  
Risk 
-
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
docking c o n t a c t .  
Loss of  v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
i n i t i a l  contacL. 
Loss of  docking system f u n c t i o n  
o r  c o n t r o l ,  
F a i l u r r  of  orb1 ter  payload module 
deployment mechanism. 
Loss of  v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  i n  cloee 
proximity t o  o t h e r  v e h i c l e .  
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
docking contac: by extendable  
tunne 1. 
Loss of  v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
cap tu re  by extendable  tunne l  
docking sys4em. 
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o u t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
c a p t u r e  by manipulator .  
Loss of  v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
cap tu re  by manipula tor .  
Loss of manipula tor  j o i n t  m o t x  
c o n t r o l .  
Loss of Communications /Command 
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  decking by 
~nmanned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of p ropu l s ion  o r  c o n t r o l  
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
manned r r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of l i f e  s u p p x t  c a p a b i l i t y  
dur ing  docking by manned free 
f l y i n g  module. 
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111-4.0 INTERFACE SAFETY REQULREMENTS AND GUIDELIKES 
This s ec t i on  contains in ter face  s a f e t y  raquirements and guidelines 
required by the space s t a t i o n  t o  be applied on +?terracing veh i c l e s .  These 
in ter face  requirements and guidel ines  were d e ~  ;.loped f  roni analyses of 
s p e c i f i c  sa f e ty  i s s u e s ,  and are grouped i n  t h i s  s ec t i on  by interfacing 
veh i c l e ,  as  fol lows : 
111-4.1 Earth Orbital Shutt le  
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111-4.1 EARTH ORBITAL SHUTTLE 
Hazardous Payloads .- 
111-4.1.1 Access f o r  v i s u a l  i n s p e c t i o n  by i n t r a v e h i c u l a r  a c t i v i t y  o r  
remotely by i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  s h a l l  b e  provided t o  a l l  primary 
s t r u c t u r e  i n s i d e  t h e  cargo bay or  equipment i n  t h e  cargo bay 
r e q u i r e d  f o r  rettrn t o  e a r t h .  (GR-1.2.004) 
II i -4.1.2 C a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  b e  provj-ded t o  i s o l a t e  o r b i t e r  environmental  
c o n t r o l  s y s  tem from payload t o  p reven t  t o x i c  fumes from e n t e r i n g  
t h e  orb1 ter. (RR-I.. 2.003) 
Docking 
111-4.1.3 Maneuvering procedures dur ing  docking s h a l l  prec lude  d i r e c t i n g  sun- 
l i g h t  i n t o  c o n t r o l l i n g  crew's eyes  o r  i n t o  t h e  v id icon  tubes  of t h e  
v i s u a l  s y s  t e m .  (RP-2.1.001) 
111-4.1.4 Thermal p r o t e c t i o n  s h a l l  be  provided t o  prevent  j e t  plume impinge- 
ment damage from docking v e h i c l e s  w i t h i n  t h e  des ign  angu la r  and 
l i n e a r  misalignments.  (RR-2.1.004) 
111-4.1.5 Two o r  more manipula tors  s h a l l  be provided i n  a manipula tor  docking 
system. Each manipula tor  s h a l l  be capable  of performing docklng by 
i t s e l f ,  and s h a l l  a l s o  be capable  of  cont inuing any docking func t ion  
i n  t h e  event  of  a f a i l u r e  of t h e  o t h e r  manipula tor  a t  any s t a g e  of 
t h e  docking. (RR-2.4.003) 
t 
This  s e c t i o n  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  some of t h e  requirements  and 
g u i d e l i n e s .  This  d i s c u s s j o n  i s  confined t o  cases  i n  which t h e  r a t i o n a l e  may 
n o t  b e  obvious,  o r  where some c l a r i f y i n g  exp lana t ions  a r e  i n  o rde r .  The 
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  generfil  fol lows t h e  o r d e r  of the  requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s ,  
and r e f e r e n c e  is  r.ade i n  pa ren theses ,  where a p ~ r o p r i a t e ,  t o  s p e c i f i c  r equ i re -  
ments and g u i d e l i n e s .  
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111-5.0 RATIONALE FOR REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
Wherever a  f l u i d  can c r e a t e  an immediate hazard i f  r e l e a s e d  from 
i ts  c o n t a i n e r  i n t o  a  p r e s s u r i z e d  environment,  double containment 
is recommended. This  impl ies  a  double f a i l u r e  t o  r e s u l t  i n  a  
hazardous r e l e a s e  of the f l u i d .  I n  o r d e r  t o  ensure  t h a t  t h i s  
redundancy is a v a i l a b l e ,  the  volume be tween che double c o n t a i n e r s  
m u s t  be monitnred f o r  leakage. Venting c a p a b i l i t y  is necessary  
t o  al low ;he o u t s i d e  c o n t a i n e r  t o  be  of reasonably l ight -weight  
cons t ruc t ion .  (3.1.1) 
111-5.2 Thermal i n s u l a t i o n  f o r  p o r t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  r a d i a t i o n  from a f i r e  
and t o  reduce h e a t  conduction i n t o  s t r u c t u r e  an;' equipment would 
cons iderably  reduce the  hazard from a f i r e  i n  t,le cargo bay. 
This  i s  n o t  g e n e r a l l y  considered f e a s i b l e ,  hm-ever,  because of 
t h e  weight and volume c o n s t r a i n t s .  and is  only reconnnendec; f o r  
e s s e n t i a l  ins t rumenta t ion .  (3.1.6) 
111-5.3 One of  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  means f c r  cont::.;.ning a f i r e  i n  zero-g 
is t o  e l i m i n a t e  convect ion c u r r e n t s ,  thu.; c u t t i n g  down t h e  flow 
of f r e s h  oxygen t o  t h e  f i r e .  Forced a i r  c i r c u l a t i o n  should  be  
c u t  o f f  immediately i f  a f i r e  i s  detecr r .d ,  and c a p a b i l i t y  t o  do 
t h i s  automat ica ly  should  be  provib?< i n  case  the  payload is 
unmanned ar *,he time. (3.1.7) 
The s t a t e -o f - the -a r t  i s  approaching the  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  des ign  
p r e s s u r e  tanks  so t h a t  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  mode when overpressur ized  
does no t  produce sh rapne l .  This  can be  done, f o r  example, by 
using a p p r o p r i a t e l y  l a r g e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y ,  o r  by us ing  f i b e r -  
g l a s s  wound tanks.  Shrapnel  is p o t e n t i a l l y  c a t a s t r o p h i c  t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r ,  an6 use  of sh rapne l - f ree  tanks would t h e r e f o r e  b e  h i g h l y  
d e s i r a b l e .  Because t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  doubt about  t h e  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  
of achieving t h i s ,  i t  i s  c a l l e d  o u t  a s  a g u i d e l i n e  r a t h e r  than a 
requirement.  (3  . 1.12) 
111-5 . 5 Cargo t r a n s f e r r e d  wi th  mechanical a s s i s t  should  n o t  be u n r e s t r a i n e d  
at  r i g h t  ang les  t o  t h e  d r i e c t i o n  of motion, s i n c e  t h i s  could r e s u l t  
in damage by impact.  (3.1.16) 
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111-5.6 I f  a c o r r o s i v e  f l u i d  l e a k s  i n  t h e  cargo bay, expansion and evapora- 
t i o n  may cause some of the  f l u i d  t o  f r e e z e ,  p o s s i b l y  a t t a c h e d  t o  
s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment. This  may remain f rozen  u n t i l  re-entry 
o r  l and ing ,  when t h e  s o l i d  may melt and i n c r e a s e  i ts  c o r r o s i v e  
a c t i o n .  Means f o r  applying h e a t  t o  any s o l i d i f i e d  f l u u i d s  a r e  
t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e d ,  p o s s i b l y  by I V A  o r  EVA pe r sonne l ,  t o  evapora te  
and d i s p e r s e  t h e  f rozen  f l u i d s .  (3.2.7) 
111-5.7 I t  should  t a k e  a t  l e a s t  a double f a i l u r e  t o  r e s u l t  i n  r e l e a s e  of 
hazardous f l u i d s  dur ing  cargo t r a n s f e r .  Double containment is 
t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e d ,  wi th  means t o  v e r i f y  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of both  
c o n t a i n e r s  s o  as t o  ensure  t h e  requ i red  redundancy. (3.2.9) 
111-5.8 Tine maximum speed a t  which any p i e c e  of hand-carr ied cargo may be 
p r o p e l l e d ,  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o r  by a c c i d e n t ,  has  been es t ima ted  on 
human f a c t o r s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  b e  3 m/sec (10 f t l s e c ) .  Cargo 
should  b e  designed t o  s u r v i v e  such an impact. An a l t e r n a t i v e  
means of s p e c i f y i n g  t h i s  l i m i t  could be by d e f i n i n g  t h e  momentum 
o f  t h e  package, thus a l lowing f o r  an i n v e r s e  v a r i a t i o n  of v e l o c i t y  
wi th  mass. (3.2.11) 
111-5.9 L i m i t a t i o n s  should be  placed on t h e  mass and i n e r t i a s  o r  hand- 
c a r r i e d  cargo. The b e s t  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  has been used,  b u t  these  
l i m i t s  should  be up-dated i f  b e t t e r  human f a c t o r s  d a t a  becomes 
a v a i l a b l e .  (3.2.14, 3.4.1) 
111-5.10 Toxic f l u i d s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  t o x i c  when i n  a gaseous o r  f i n e l y  
d iv ided  form. A t o x i c  environment i s  t h e r e f o r e  cons idered  
d a t e c t a b l e ,  e .g. ,  by a gas ana lyze r .  By c o n t r a s t ,  c o r r o s i v e  
f l u i d s  g e n e r a l l y  a c t  i n  a l i q u i d  form and cannot  p r a c t i c a l l y  
b e  d e t e c t e d .  (3.3.4) 
111-5.11 Jamming o f  cargo i n  doors ,  ha tches  o r  o t h e r  r c a t r i c t e d  a r e a s  can 
r e s u l t  in s e v e r e  l o s s o r  damage i f  n o t  handled wi th  method and 
pa t i ence .  Procedures f o r  r e l e s s i n g  such cargo should be  developed 
ahead of  time. C e r t a i n  t o o l s  o r  o t h e r  a i d s  may a l s o  be found 
necessary  by developing tt, -se procedures.  (3.4.5) 
111-5.12 The "buddy" system i s  recommended when hazardous f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l  
is being handled s o  t h a t  one man can come t o  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of 
t h e  o t h e r  i n  t h e  event  of an acc iden t  o r  problem. Handling of 
hazardous f l u i d s  o r  m a t e r i a l s  ahould be a ded ica ted  t a s k ,  s o  a s  
n o t  t o  a l low a problem t o  occur  because of i n t e r f e r e n c e  wi th  
o t h e r  t a sks .  (3.4.12) 
111-5.13 A s i n g l e  acc iden t  could damage two o r  more con tn ine r s .  Mutually 
r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  should t h e r e f o r e  not  be handled toge the r .  (3.4.13) 
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111-5.14 R e l a t i v e l y  f e d  u s e s  of r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  p l a n n e d  
f o r  s o r t i e  and s o l a r - a r r a y  powered s p a c e  s t a t i o n  m i s s i o n s .  Howvet- ,  
Atomic Energy Commission r e g u l a t i o n s  c a l l  f o r  s t r i c t  sai-e t v  measures 
t o  keep c o n t r o l  of t h e  r , l d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l ,  and t o  mi rkn ize  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of expos ing  the  g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  on e a r t h  t o  e x c e s s i v e  
r a d i a t i o n  a s  a  r e s u l t  of an a c c i d e n t .  (3 .2 .16 ,  3.2.17) 
